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Abstract
This thesis analyses the issue of competition for hospital services, introduced in 
the UK by the NHS reform in 1991.
The work is structured around two main questions: whether efficient contracts 
for hospital services can be devised by economic theory, and whether efficiency 
and productivity have actually changed since the introduction of the reform. For 
data reasons, the focus of this second part is on Scotland only.
Chapter 1 is a general introduction to the work.
Chapter 2 performs the theoretical analysis. The economic literature on hospital 
contracts in discussed first, and a model is then developed which takes into 
consideration the existence of waiting time and its effect on patients’ utility. The 
conclusions cast some doubts on the possibility of defining an optimal contract, 
and emphasise the possible drawbacks of the prospective payment systems 
suggested by the reform.
Chapters 3 to 5 are devoted to the empirical analysis. As one of the main aims of 
the reform was to improve efficiency, this is the focus of the research, and the 
approach is the estimation of production frontiers, reviewed in Chapter 3.
The data are a sample of 53 acute hospitals in Scotland between 1991/92 and 
1996/97 (the beginning and the end of the reform).
Two methods of estimation are used because of their complementarity: the non- 
parametric DEA and Malmquist indexes are the subject of Chapter 4; the 
econometric estimation of stochastic distance functions is in Chapter 5. The 
results show an improvement in productivity whereas the improvement in 
technical efficiency is controversial and not related to the working of the reform 
(represented by hospitals’ trust status). Furthermore, a change in the technology 
of production and in what hospitals produce is found, which casts some doubts 
on the beneficial effects of the reform.
The general conclusions are in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the issue of competition for hospital services, 
which was introduced in the UK in 1991. The work is structured around two 
main questions: whether efficient contracts for hospital services can be devised 
by economic theory, and whether efficiency and general performance have 
actually changed since the introduction of the reform. For data reasons, the focus 
of this second part is on Scotland only.
The chapters are organised as follows.
Chapter I is a general introduction to the whole work.
Chapter 2 analyses the theory of contracts for hospital services, and develops a 
model in which waiting time is taken into consideration.
Chapters 3 to 5 are devoted to the empirical analysis: Chapter 3 reviews the 
literature on performance measurement; Chapter 4 carries out a non-parametric, 
deterministic analysis using DEA and Malmquist indexes; Chapter 5 estimates a 
parametric, stochastic distance function.
The comparison of the methodologies and of the results is in Chapter 6, together 
with the general conclusions of the work.
As regards this introductory chapter, the structure is the following: Section 1.1 is 
a description of the NHS reform, which motivated the research. Section 1.2 
summarises some of the issues of the economic analysis of competition in health 
services. Section 1.3 details the aims of the work and summarises the content of 
each chapter.
1.1 The reform of the NHS.
Since its foundation in 1948 the NHS remained largely unchanged, in terms of 
organisation and objectives, until the introduction of the White Paper Working 
for Patients in December 1989. Without privatising the health service, as the 
sector remained public and funded by general taxation, this reform changed 
many key aspects of its organisation with the general aim of reshaping it in a 
more efficient, “business-like” way.
The reform originated in a growing sense of crisis and dissatisfaction, especially 
during the 70s and the 80s (Baggott, 1994; Butler, 1994). General problems, such 
as the existence of geographical and social inequalities in the distribution of 
health and health services, growing waiting lists for treatment resulting from the 
increasing demand, ward closures, and a general problem of underfunding, 
started to be attributed also to deficiencies and inefficiencies of the system itself.
In line with the government conviction about the superior efficiency 
characteristics of private markets, the debate about underfunding was replaced by 
the concern about the lack of incentives to ensure efficient resource allocation 
within a public system. This was seen as inflexible and ineffective in the 
attribution of responsibilities, fragmented among too many authorities and 
lacking co-ordination. Thus the apparent need to “slim” and reorganise it in a 
more efficient way (Holliday, 1992; Le Grand, 1994; Baggot, 1994; Bartlett and 
Harrison, 1993).
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The White Paper Working for Patients was published in December 1989, and 
was followed by the NHS and Community Care Act in June 1990, with effect 
from April 1991. The general aim of the reform was to increase responsiveness 
to the needs of the population, to provide better services in terms of quality and 
quantity and a better use of the resources in terms of increased cost- 
consciousness.
One of the most apparent changes was the introduction of a market system (the 
“internal market”) between providers and purchasers of hospital services, based 
on contractual relationships. Their roles and responsibilities would be 
distinguished and separated, creating a demand and a supply side: on the former, 
the District Health Authorities (DHAs) and the (newly created) GPs fund- 
holders, on the latter the new hospital trusts and private hospitals. Non trusts 
would continue to work as Directly Managed Units, i.e. with direct involvement 
of the DHA in their management. Their number was soon to fall.
Before the reform the DHAs had mixed responsibilities, covering both the 
planning of the services and the management of hospitals and other units. 
Hospitals were funded by means of a budget which basically reflected their 
historical costs.
After the reform, the role of the DHAs became to assess the needs of their 
resident population, set the priorities and ensure the availability of services, at the 
least possible cost and at zero cost for the patient. In their new role of purchasers 
of health care, they would define and conclude contracts with the providers to
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buy health services. For this purpose, they would receive a budget from the DoH 
on a weighted capitation basis. A similar, but more restrictive, role was that of 
the GPs fund-holders, whose budget was top-sliced from that of the DHAs.
On the providers’ side, the main change was the creation of the self-governing 
hospital trusts (see also Bartlett and Le Grand, 1994). Although still public and 
accountable to the Secretary of State, they were set as independent institutions 
and were given a greater autonomy in the management of their resources. Within 
limits', they could freely use and dispose of their capital assets, set wages and 
decide the level and composition of their staff, retain surpluses and build up 
reserves with which to improve their services and finance investments. Their 
funding would now come from the contracts concluded with the purchasers. The 
idea behind the reform was that competition among hospitals in order to get 
contracts would lead to efficiency gains.
In the words of the White Paper.
“...The Government believes that self government for hospitals will encourage a 
stronger sense o f local ownership and pride...It will stimulate the commitment 
and harness the skills of those who are directly responsible for providing 
services. Supported by a funding system in which successful hospitals can 
flourish, it will encourage local initiative and local competition. All this will in 
turn ensure a better deal for the public, improving the choice and quulity o f  the 1
1 Different limits have been imposed to the autonomy of trusts, hy the White Paper anil after that, 
as regards their borrowing facilities, their pricing systems and costing procedures (prices must he 
based on average costs) etc.
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services offered and the efficiency with which those services are delivered..." 
(WhitePaper, 1989, point 3.3).
As regards the kind of contracts to be used, the law was however extremely 
general. Three possible types were mentioned. Simple block contracts were 
suggested for the very beginning, a period that the Government referred to as 
“steady state”: the meaning was that the main changes were not expected to take 
place all at once, in order to give time to the system to get used to them more 
gradually. A block contract consisted of the payment of an annual fee to the 
hospital in exchange for a defined range of services and facilities. This required 
very little information and detail and recreated a situation very similar to the one 
preceding the reform, with the major difference though of leaving all the risk on 
the provider (a problem that translated for example into the denial of access to 
hospital care because of the exhaustion of all available funds before the end of 
the year).
The other two kinds of contracts were cost-per-case and cost-and-volume 
contracts. With the former, the hospitals receive a fixed price per case treated, 
with the latter this price varies with the volume of work provided. For both, the 
cases are all classified into different diagnostic categories (like the American 
Diagnostic Related Groups, or DRGs), and the informational requirements are 
more complex. The only guidance given by the law in this respect was a general 
(and almost meaningless) reference of the price to be set equal to the average 
cost. These last two kinds of contract became increasingly common (Appleby, 
1994). Not surprisingly, the analysis of the different incentive properties of
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different kinds of contracts became of great interest. This will be discussed in 
Chapter 2.
The victory of the Labour Party at the general elections in 1997 and in 2001 
brought some changes to the system again, substituting “competition” with “co­
operation”. However, the separation between health authorities and hospitals 
would be maintained, as well as many of the features of the internal market.
The political debate on the optimal organisation of (health and) hospital services 
is therefore still ongoing, and it is an issue not only in the UK.
1.2 Some economic issues.
The link between competition and efficiency is not so obvious in the case of 
health services. The literature on the economics of health care points to some 
characteristics of health provision that lead to market failures (see for example 
Culyer, 1971, 1991; McGuire et al. 1988). Together with equity considerations, 
this is one of the reasons why traditionally in many countries health care is 
publicly funded and provided (Hoffmeyer and McCarthy, 1994).
The main points can be summarised as follows.
6
\First of all, health care is typically characterised by a high degree of uncertainty 
about future needs and future events2. The argument of bounded rationality on 
the conclusion of contracts is especially true for this sector: illnesses and their 
seriousness, or the kind of services that will be needed cannot be exactly foreseen 
and specified in a contract. This can translate into costly renegotiations or 
disputes, i.e. into high transaction costs. As shown by the early experience of 
simple block contracts in the UK, uncertainty led to the refusal of treatment for 
exhaustion of funds. The problem is made worse the higher is the degree of risk 
aversion of the agents.
Informational requirements are the source of other market failures. The implicit 
requirement of perfect information of a perfectly competitive market is in fact 
particularly hard to meet in the case of hospital services.
Providers must be able to exactly define and cost their activities in order to price 
them correctly. Cost allocation is particularly complicated because of the 
multiproduct nature of the service and the intrinsic problems in the definition of 
output itself (Elwood, 1996). This can increase the administrative costs of the 
service in general, a feature that became apparent quite soon after the reform as 
UK hospitals were not used to such detailed pricing and had to invest in 
specialised staff and information technology.
Purchasers must be able to observe and compare the kind and quality of the 
services they are offered in order to make efficient choices. Hospital services 
(health services in general) can be instead characterised by a high degree of
2 For a general discussion of this topic, see for example Chalkley and Malcomson (1996);
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asymmetric information between supplier and demander, be this the final 
consumer (the patient) or its agent on the quasi-market. The multiplicity of 
services offered and the various dimensions to quality are very difficult and/or 
very costly to observe and monitor.
The existence of asymmetric information to the advantage of the provider can 
create space for his opportunistic behaviour and moral hazard: for example in 
terms of supply-induced demand, especially in a pure market system, and/or of 
inefficient service-mix and choice of quality level. The first is a widely discussed 
problem in the US literature because of their private, insurance-based system; the 
second is at the centre of the debate on optimal contracting in general, as will be 
seen in Chapter 2.
Other issues question the possibility of competition (Propper, 1994, 1996). The 
hospital sector is characterised by high sunk costs, both in terms of general 
capital requirements and asset specificity. The existence of possible economies 
of scale and/or scope would make it even more unlikely (as well as inefficient) to 
have many providers.
The literature on this point as regards the UK is not conclusive (Bartlett 
and LeGrand, 1992), and in general the literature on economies of scope and 
scale in the hospital sector shows different and contradictory results (Butler, 
1995). However, evidence from the US (Propper, 1994) suggests that a tendency 
towards oligopolistic or even monopolistic provision can be the result of other 
factors, like the purchaser’s concern for quality and its unobservability: it is
Propper (1994); Smith and Wright (1994).
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\preferable to renew the contracts to the incumbents, in order to avoid the high 
search costs and the risk associated to a change of provider.
For the UK, this is expressed by the concern that DHAs, instead of 
shopping around, might just continue to send their patients to the local provider 
with whom they have been working for years.
It appears from the above that the benefits of competition in this sector are open 
to debate under many respects. The next section will clarify what issues in 
particular are considered in this thesis.
1.3 The aim of the thesis.
The summary of economic issues presented in Section 1.2 makes it clear how big 
a debate surrounds the introduction of competition in health markets.
The aim of this thesis is to focus in particular on the issue of the efficiency of 
competition for hospital services, both from a theoretical and an empirical point 
of view: does a contract exist in theory that creates an efficient market? Has the 
market actually improved its efficiency and productivity since the introduction of 
the reform?
The theoretical analysis is developed in Chapter 2. Given that a contractual 
system was introduced by the reform, the aim of the chapter is to discuss if a 
contract can be devised that gives hospitals the correct incentives so as to 
maximise social welfare.
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An overview of the literature on the contracts for hospital services is given first. 
This identifies the central problem in the trade off between incentives to cost 
reduction and incentives to quality. In terms of payment systems, this translates 
into the conflict between prospective payment systems, that pay the hospital a 
fixed price per unit of output (price-per-case contracts), and cost reimbursement 
rules. A general, basic model is presented first, that defines the main set up of the 
problem and its possible solutions. Next, other models are discussed that relax 
different assumptions: observability of costs, heterogeneity among patients 
and/or providers, observability of quality, its possible multiple dimensions etc.
Different papers make different assumptions and describe different situations. 
Overall however they point to the fact that a simple price-per-case system might 
not lead to the identified first best solution.
After the review, a model is developed that introduces the issue of waiting lists 
into the basic framework. The existence of waiting time is taken into 
consideration by the literature mostly to explain the demand for private 
insurance. The chapter instead models it as a measure of demand, taking into 
consideration the effect that it has on patients utility and therefore on social 
welfare.
The general results show that a price per person demanding treatment is to be 
preferred to a price per case. The payment of a price per case only gives 
incentives to treat patients, but leads to the choice of too low a quality level. The
in
\logic of the result lies in the mechanism that leads to the equilibrium: rewarding 
hospitals for their demand gives them direct incentives to increase the quality 
level of their service but also incentives to treat the right number of patients, 
because a too long waiting time in turn reduces demand. The empirical analysis 
shows an interesting result in this respect: a pattern over time for hospitals 
towards treating people on a day basis or directly as outpatients. No quality 
measure is available for the empirical analysis, but the concern that this 
phenomenon might also imply a lower quality than optimal is not uncommon.
A few extensions are made to the waiting lists model, in particular the hypothesis 
that social and private costs are different. When the so-called “social cost of the 
loss” is introduced, the model shows that a separate reward also for the number 
of patients treated is necessary.
The basic assumptions of the model about cost and quality observability are not 
relaxed in the chapter, and are left for future research.
The complexity of the identification of an optimal contract shown by the theory 
leads to the second question discussed in the thesis. Given that contractual 
agreements were used, what properties they showed in reality is a relevant point. 
The empirical analysis is more limited in its scope in the sense that not all the 
issues raised in theory can be tested in practice (this is especially true for the 
ones regarding quality). However, one of the main aims of the reform was to 
eliminate any waste of resources; the focus of the empirical analysis is therefore
I I
on the changes in the efficiency and productivity of hospitals. As data were 
available only for Scotland, the analysis is restricted to that country.
More in particular, the focus is on technical efficiency, as opposed to general 
cost efficiency. The latter is not considered partly because others have already 
done it (see references in Chapter 3, Section 3.5), and partly because the 
definition of the price variables is particularly difficult in the case of hospital 
services. This would have made the (possible) analysis of the technical efficiency 
component more difficult and unreliable.
Focussing on technical efficiency only allows us to see whether the claimed 
waste in resources has actually been reduced. Insights are possible about the 
technology characteristics of the sector, what hospitals produced and how they 
produced it.
The empirical analysis is developed in Chapters 3 to 5, and it consists of the 
estimation of production frontiers. The data are a panel of 53 acute hospitals in 
Scotland between 1991/92 and 1996/97, and were obtained from the Statistics 
Division of the NHS in Scotland.
Chapter 3 is a review of the literature on the estimation of production frontiers. 
This literature is divided into two main streams, the non-paramctric, mainly 
deterministic one, and the parametric, mainly stochastic one. The chapter 
analyses them both, presenting the various model definitions and characteristics. 
Applications of frontier models to the hospital sector are analysed at the end of
12
Chapter 3, with particular attention to the applications to data sets from the UK. 
The main differences and contributions of this work are detailed then and will be 
summarised shortly.
The two approaches described in Chapter 3 show almost opposite and 
complementary characteristics, which are discussed more in detail in Chapter 6. 
For this reason it is considered that a thorough analysis should make use of both 
of them in order to make a picture as complete and reliable as possible.
The non-parametric approach is the subject of Chapter 4. Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) is used to estimate production frontiers and to calculate 
Malmquist indexes of total factor productivity. In contrast, Chapter 5 uses the 
econometric, stochastic approach. In particular, because of the multiple output 
nature of the service, a stochastic distance function is estimated. This is a 
relatively recent approach, not previously applied to the hospital sector. The 
results from the two different analyses are compared in Chapter 6 in order to 
draw some general conclusions.
The main contributions and differences of the empirical analysis of this thesis 
can be summarised as follows. The data set used covers the whole period 
between the introduction of the reform and the new changes introduced after the 
victory of the Labour party in 1997. Apart from different decisions regarding the 
observations to use, which might have incorrectly led previous papers to more 
optimistic conclusions, both the parametric and non-parametric approach are 
used. This allows us not only to double-check the reliability of the results, but
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also to deepen the analysis itself. The specific changes in performance measured 
by DEA can be analysed further and related more strictly to changes in the 
technology of production and more generally to different choices as of what 
hospitals produce.
Thus, this thesis tries to address the question of the efficiency implications of the 
reform from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The overall 
conclusions of the work, regarding both theory and empirical analysis, are 
included in the final Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
CONTRACTS FOR HOSPITAL SERVICES
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the first question of the thesis: can a contract 
be devised for hospitals that leads to a socially optimal outcome. A model will be 
developed from the framework of Chalkley and Malcomson (1995a). This model 
is intended to include the existence of waiting time, as a measure of patients’ 
demand and considering that waiting time affects patients’ utility.
The chapter is structured as follows.
Section 2.1 provides an overview of the literature on hospital contracts.
Section 2.2 describes the C&M model which is the basis for the waiting lists 
model developed in Section 2.3. Some further extensions to the model are 
discussed in Section 2.4 and general conclusions are in Section 2.5.
2.1 The economic analysis of contracts for hospital services.
The key change introduced by the reform was the creation of the internal market, 
regulated by a system of contractual relationships between hospitals and the 
purchasers of their services. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the law was extremely 
vague about which kind of contracts to use. At the beginning, simple block 
contracts would have been easier because of the low informational requirements. 
However the idea was to move towards prospective payment systems that would 
pay the hospital a fixed price per case treated. This involved the definition of 
proper categories for the various kinds of cases treated, similar to the American 
DRGs. This apparently simple requirement was actually quite complicated: the
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definition of cases is far from immediate; moreover, similar cases can be treated 
differently by different hospitals and therefore have different average costs, so 
that an agreed categorisation would not be that straightforward.
Nevertheless, a contractual system had to be introduced and, given the generality 
of the law, considerable interest developed about the different incentive 
properties of different kinds of contracts.
There is a very large literature1 on the incentive properties of different payment 
systems to hospitals. Most comes from the USA, especially after the introduction 
in 1983 of a prospective payment system, which replaced the traditional cost 
reimbursement rule. A good review of the main issues of contracting in the NHS 
is in Barker et al (1996) and in Chalkley and Malcomson (1995c, 1996).
The characteristic which is common to all this literature is that of dealing with a 
multitask agency problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991) which is expressed 
in at least two potentially conflicting objectives: reducing the costs of the service 
without reducing the quality level.
Cost reimbursement rules, that pay the hospitals on the basis of the costs they 
actually incurred, lack the incentives for cost reduction. The main alternative are 
prospective payment systems, that consist of the payment of a fixed price per unit 
of output. The hospital is made the residual claimant for its costs and this gives it 
powerful incentives to reduce them (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). However, this can
1 A very good survey of the issues discussed by the literature is in Chalkley and Malcolmson 
(1998)
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lead to too low a quality level, as quality is costly but usually unmeasurable and 
unenforceable by contract.
This is the key problem discussed by the literature. The solutions to it differ only 
marginally and they depend on several things: the characteristics of the system 
considered (for example, if demand comes from privately insured patients), the 
assumptions made on the degree of asymmetric information between purchasers 
and providers (for example about their costs and/or about the quality level of the 
service), the heterogeneity of providers or patients, and so on.
A good general set up of the problem is given by Chalkley and Malcomson 
(1995a). The model describes the contractual relationship between a self- 
interested provider, that maximises their financial surplus, and a purchaser that 
maximises a social welfare function which depends on the number of cases 
treated and on the quality level of the treatment. The original demand for 
treatment comes from an exogenously given number of patients but the actual, 
final demand comes from the purchaser (in the UK this would correspond to the 
Health Authority or the GP fundholder) who buys hospital services for them.
Costs are assumed to be known to the purchaser. Most importantly, it is assumed 
that demand correctly perceives the quality level of the service. As demand is 
filtered, or represented, by the purchaser this is equivalent to assuming that it is 
this latter to have such capability.
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In this framework, a prospective payment that rewards hospitals on a price per 
case basis is not optimal, unless the system is demand constrained, because it 
leads to the treatment of too many patients; the first best solution is achieved by 
rewarding hospitals separately for the people they treat and for those that ask for 
treatment. The result holds true under different capacity constraints as well as 
when assuming different quality dimensions.
The importance of the perception of quality by demand is not new to the 
literature. Its possible perverse effects have been often emphasised for the case of 
the US market. In the US system, where demand is fully insured, hospitals 
started competing on the quality of services that mattered to patients in order to 
attract them. Their misperception of the real quality level of the service translated 
into a waste of resources in amenities and facilities or unnecessary treatments, 
which in turn raised average costs.
The hypothesis that buyers might not infer quality correctly is also analysed in 
Chalkley and Malcomson (1995b). All other assumptions remaining the same as 
in their previous paper, no contract solves the trade off between low costs and 
low quality. Only a second best solution can be achieved, by means of a mixed 
system that combines the fixed price per case to a partial cost reimbursement.
The possibility that hospitals might not be maximising their financial surplus, but 
have ethical and altruistic concerns, as suggested by Newhouse (1970), is next 
explored in their (1995b) paper. Simple block contracts can now achieve welfare 
maximisation, but only if demand can be correctly predicted by the purchaser
i x
(which is the equivalent of always having a waiting list at the end of the time 
period, so that hospitals always work at full capacity), or if hospitals can finance 
their debts. If this is not the case, then hospitals might decide to treat too few 
people, and cost and volume contracts are to be preferred.
Similar considerations about the “benevolence” of hospitals and how they could 
make sub-optimal decisions from a social welfare point of view are also in 
Rogerson (1994). Patients’ heterogeneity is taken into consideration, and the 
proposed solution is a prospective payment system that price differentiates 
according to different demand elasticities. This is more suitable to the insurance- 
based US market, which is in fact the focus of the analysis.
Ma (1994), using a model in which no explicit role is given to the number of 
patients treated so that everything is expressed in terms of quality levels, shows 
that a prospective payment system is efficient also when considering the 
distribution of patients’ health conditions. A mixed system of fixed price and 
partial cost reimbursement is suggested when allowing for the possibility of 
dumping, that is if hospitals can refuse treatment to the most expensive patients.
Similar conclusions are reached by Lillis and McGuire (1986, 1991) and by Lillis 
(1998): a mixed system including some cost reimbursement. Rather than talking 
of quality levels Ellis and McGuire focus on the multiplicity of services offered 
by the hospital once the patient has been admitted (like Rogerson, 1994). Ellis 
(1998) extends the analysis into a Cournot-Nash model in which hospitals can 
choose to cream skim, skimp or dump patients. Again, a mixed payment system
is proved superior to simple prospective payment and cost reimbursement. 
Focussing on the types of services provided rather than on quality is equivalent 
for the rationale of the problem. What is more relevant is that again these models 
are built to explain the conditions of the US market, where demand comes from 
fully insured patients potentially asking for an excessive level of health services. 
Incentives have to be considered also for the demand side, and the mixed system 
is the result of this interaction.
Quality discrimination among patients is the focus of the analysis of Allen and 
Gertler (1991) in a paper that supports the process of horizontal integration 
between demand and supply side, as in the case of the American HMOs (Health 
Maintenance Organisations). Again, a reality that is very different from the UK
case.
The existence of asymmetric information about the costs of the provider is 
emphasised by De Fraja (2000). A regulatory model is developed, that allows for 
heterogeneity among providers, among patients and for the possibility of 
dumping. The results show that a simple price per case is not optimal and the 
solution is to devise a contract that links higher prices to a higher throughput. 
The logic of the result is that a higher price will give an incentive to more 
efficient hospitals to treat more expensive patients. If the price is set correctly 
this incentive will not work for less efficient hospitals, as the increase in revenue 
will not cover them for the increase in costs.
2«
The above review is clearly not exhaustive of the whole literature, but is rather 
an overview of what the main issues are and how they are usually dealt with. The 
superiority of prospective payment systems to cost reimbursement ones is 
acknowledged in all cases, and some empirical evidence of their cost saving 
efficiency in the UK has been provided (see for example Propper, 1996). 
However, depending on the particular assumptions made, more complex forms of 
payment are suggested. No theory has yet been developed that was able to tackle 
all the different issues at the same time.
An issue that has not been given much consideration in the analysis of contracts 
is that of waiting time2. In the contracting context, the existence of waiting lists 
has been usually considered as an indirect measure of quality, often to explain 
the demand for private insurance (Besley et al., 1999; Propper 2000).
This will be the topic of the next section. The model of Chalkley and Malcomson 
(1995a) (C&M from now on) will be extended to analyse a situation in which an 
explicit role is given to the existence of waiting time; this will be considered as a 
measure of hospital demand, taking into consideration the adverse effects that it 
has on patients utility, and therefore on social welfare.
2 A more “technical" health economics literature on the issue exists (sec for example Propper, 
1995), but the perspective and approach are very different from those of this thesis.
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2.2 The C&M model.
The situation modelled by C&M is the definition of a contract between a 
purchaser of hospital services and a self-interested hospital. The purchaser buys 
the services for the patients, and it maximises a social welfare function. The 
hospital maximises a utility function that is increasing in its financial surplus3. 
The contracting system and the determination of the purchaser’s budget are taken 
as given, and no ethical or professional considerations enter the hospital’s utility 
function.
The logic and the structure of the model can be summarised like this. The two 
objective functions are identified (that is, the purchaser’s social welfare function 
and the hospital’s utility function) and maximised with respect to the relevant 
variables, so that two sets of first order conditions (F.O.C.) are identified. As the 
hospital’s utility function depends on the (kind of) payment it receives, the point 
is to choose a payment system that equates the two sets of F.O.C., so that the 
hospital makes a choice that maximises social welfare. This result is defined as a 
first best solution.
More in detail, define h(x,q) as the benefit perceived by the purchaser of treating 
x  patients with quality level q. This is increasing in both variables and strictly 
concave in q.
C(x,q,f) is the cost for the hospital and is assumed to be increasing, convex in x 
and strictly convex in q \ f  is the effort in cost reduction. The cost is assumed to
1 For a discussion of models of hospital behaviour see for example Newhouse (1970), Pauly and 
Redish (1973), Bulter (1995) or C&M (1995b).
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be known to the purchaser, whereas q cannot be monitored and so cannot be 
enforced by contract.
Utility for the hospital is given by 
U = s -  v<x,qj)
where s is the financial surplus and v a disutility component. Reservation utility 
for the hospital is v .
The social welfare function can be written as
W= [h(x,q) - .v -  C(x,qJ)] + [s -  v(x,q,f))] - alC(x,qJ) + s] (2.1)
where a  >0 is to allow for distortions from raising revenue from taxation. The 
purchaser is maximising (2.1) subject to the constraint
s -v (x ,q j)> v  (2.2)
Rearranging (2.1) and observing that it is a decreasing function of .v, so that (2.2) 
will always hold as an equality, it can be rewritten as
W = b(x,q) -  (1+a)lC(x,q,f) + v(x,q,f)] -av  (2.3)
The hospital objective function is to maximise
H = s -  vfx.q.f) s.t. B(x,y,C) -  C(x,qJ) - s  = 0 (2.4)
B(.) is the total payment received by the hospital and it can be made dependent 
on the number of cases x, on the demand y(q), which is assumed to be increasing 
in quality, or on costs depending on the contract chosen4, but it cannot be directly 
a function of q. Thus hospital revenues can be affected by quality only via the 
effect that this has on demand.
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The model consists of maximising (2.3) and (2.4) with respect to x , q and/under 
the further constraint that
x< x(q )  (2.5)
where x(q) is the maximum number of patients that can be treated by a hospital 
and is given by
x(q) = minly(q), k]
that is the minimum value of demand y(q) and the capacity (maximum possible 
supply) of the hospital, k.
If (2.3) subject to (2.5) is maximised at x \  q* and f , the problem is to find the 
payment system li(.) that maximises (2.4) subject to (2.5) at exactly the same 
values. Mathematically, this is done by substituting the solutions to the 
purchaser’s F.O.C. in the hospitals’ F.O.C. A first best solution exists if there is a 
payment system that guarantees that the equations hold. This first best solution 
means that hospitals will choose to treat the optimal number of patients, at the 
optimal quality level.
The following results are obtained by C'&M.
1) For the case of a demand constrained system, that is when
* -  y(‘i )  < *
the payment of a lump-sum transfer Ts and the use of a price per case contract of 
the form li = \>x leads to the desired result if the price /> = dli/dx -  /</' is set as
* Fur example with a cost per ease contract /< = /)«; with cost reimbursement H = C(x ,q ,J ) ,  with 
partial cost sharing li = [>x + (pc', and so on.
'  This is required to ensure that equation (2.2) always holds as an equality.
(> All variables with a subscript represent a derivative
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Bx = bx - a ( C x + vx) +
bq ~<*(Cq + *’„)
(2 .6)
evaluated at the socially optimal values. That is, (2.6) reflects the marginal 
benefit of treating an additional patient and the marginal benefit of quality, 
calculated from the marginal increase in demand, all net of the cost of tax 
distortion.
2) If the system is unconstrained or capacity constrained, that is respectively
x <x(q*) 
and
x* = k < y(q*)
then the optimal pricing rule will be given by 
Bx = bx - a ( C x + vx)
Two different prices are in (2.7), a price per case Bx and a price per patient 
demanding treatment By. The optimal price per case equals the marginal benefit 
at the number of cases treated; the optimal price per patient demanding treatment 
reflects the marginal benefit of quality for the marginal patient; both prices are 
net of the marginal cost of tax distortion.
The rationale of the results is the following. A fixed price per case set as in (2.6) 
leads to the efficient outcome. Hospitals increase the quality level up to q in 
order to attract patients, and treat all the patients demanding treatment at that 
quality level. This works only if the system is demand constrained. In the case of
bq - a ( C q + vq)
y<
(2.7)
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an unconstrained system, the optimal number of cases to treat at the optimal 
quality level is lower than the number of people demanding treatment. If 
hospitals are rewarded for the number of people they treat, they will have an 
incentive to treat too many. Rewarding them separately for the number of 
treatments and for the number of referrals for future treatment (i.e. for their 
demand) solves the problem. A similar argument, but for opposite reasons, 
applies in the case of a capacity constraint. If the hospital cannot treat more than 
k patients it doesn’t need to increase its level of quality up to q* in order to attract 
them, and will therefore choose too low a quality level7 *. Finally, a payment 
system like (2.7) works efficiently in all cases, i.e. whether the system is 
constrained or unconstrained.
In all cases the optimal setting of the price makes hospitals choose f*. This 
comes from the fact that being the residual claimants of their costs gives them the 
incentives to cost minimisation.
2.3 The waiting lists model.
For a competitive market and with convex costs, C&M show that a linear pricing 
system can lead to the first best solution: hospitals have an incentive not to 
reduce quality levels in order to attract patients, which are their source of 
income. Quality does not need to be monitored or specified in the contract; all 
that is required is observability of demand and that this is responsive to quality11.
7 The generalisation to multiple quality levels is offered in C&M paper hut is not dealt with here.
K The argument is even stronger if contracts are short term, because of a reputation effect.
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The first argument is strictly linked with the discussion of the role of waiting 
lists, which are considered below. The second one, which is quite a strong 
assumption, is less critical for the case of the NHS because demand does not 
come directly from patients but is filtered by their GPs referrals and by the 
Health Authorities (as was discussed in the model above). These purchasers are 
in a better position to collect and process information about the quality of 
treatment provided by different hospitals. This is equivalent to considering health 
care as a search good and not an experience good (as it is for the single patient), 
thus avoiding much of the informational problems that are typical of the sector.
The main change brought to the C&M model is the introduction of waiting lists. 
These are considered as a measure of patients’ demand, and thus an indirect 
measure of quality, taking into consideration that they negatively affect patients’ 
utility. The model is constructed as follows.
If patients get treatment of quality q, their utility from this treatment can be 
defined as
U = q (2.8)
If treatment is postponed by w periods, where w is the time length of the waiting 
list, then (2.8) must allow for a discounting factor reflecting time preference, and 
for a factor reflecting the risk of a worsening of patients conditions while 
waiting.
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Define r the time preference factor and li the conditional probability of “dying' 
at time f, having survived until then9, the expected utility of a patient is
(2.9)
Now define g as the number of people in front of a patient in the queue; its 
change over time will be given by
where x is the number of cases treated. Considering a steady state situation in 
which x (and later y, the demand) is constant, then (2.10) can be solved to obtain
Equation (2.11) means that the number of people in front of a person in the queue 
is a function of G (the number of people at the beginning, when t = 0) and it 
decreases with time, partly because they are treated partly because they die. 
When t = w then g(t) = 0 and (2.11) can be solved with respect to w, i.e.
Moreover, the number of people in a queue changes over time as
where y is the number of people joining a queue, or each hospital’s demand. In 
steady state, when G is constant then
9 In particular, F(t) is the probability distribution function of dying at any point in time;
g = - x - h g (2 . 10)
(2. 11)
G = y  — x  — hG (2.13)
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Substituting (2.14) into (2.12) and then into (2.9) finally gives
r+/i
(2.15)
Equation (2.15) is an expression of the expected utility of joining a queue at 
hospital j, and in equilibrium this value will be the same for every hospital.
In the social welfare function the benefit is now the expected utility of a cohort 
of patients asking for treatment at all hospitals at time 0; hospitals costs are 
discounted by a factor <?'m= (x/y)r,h as they will be incurred only after w periods. 
The same discount rate r is assumed for both patients and hospitals, but these 
assumptions will be relaxed in the next section.
The social welfare function can be now written as
In this case v is the present value of the hospitals’ reservation utility.
On the hospitals’ side, the objective function is like in C&M but with the cost­
discounting factor. The demand function y(x,q) for each hospital is derived from 
(2.15) as
W = X  \ y ^ i
h
(2.17)
c hl = I -F(l) is the probability of surviving t periods, so that h -- lf^ '* is the conditional
probability as in text.
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where U is the level of utility available at other hospitals. 
Substituting (2.17) into the discount factor formula finally gives
H  = B (x ,y ( x ,q ) ) - [ C (x ,q ,f )  + v (x ,q ,f)]
f u  V * (2.18)
which is the hospitals’ objective function. Consistently with C&M results, in 
(2.18) the payment system B(.) has been directly specified as a function of the 
number of cases treated and the volume of demand10.
The simultaneous maximisation of (2.16) and (2.18) with respect to x, q and /  
leads to the following system of F.O.C.
W. = —  < /-(l + « )(C t + v jr) - - L (l + «)(C  + v) \ -  
h hx Jl y
■ 0 (2.19)
W, = [ * - ( ! + ar)(C ,+ v , ) ] (2.20)
Wf  = -(1 + a )(C f  + vf )f x '
y y  J
= 0 (2 .21)
H x = Bx +
' u ' r+h
—  B — C — v
[ u  '  * )
=  0 ( 2 .22)
H « =
r, hx ^  x . r(C + v) B.,------— -(C „  + v„) +
(r + h)U (r + h)q
'U _ ' = o (2.23)
H f  = - ( C /  + vf )
y «  j
=  0 (2.24)
10 The consequences of other payment systems are in Appendix 2.1.
30
To proceed (2.19) is equated with (2.22), (2.20) with (2.23) and (2.21) with 
(2.24).
First of all, (2.21) and (2.24) will always be the same, that is hospitals have an 
incentive to maximise the effort in cost reduction, i.e. with a prospective 
payment system they will always choose/*. As regards the choice of x and q, 
solving with respect to the price variables leads to
Equation (2.26) is the same price per patient demanding treatment as in C&M 
(see equation (2.7)) except for the presence of the discount factor and its 
sensitivity to quality changes. As could be expected, the optimal price, and hence 
the marginal benefit for the hospital, equals the marginal social benefit, net of a 
portion ra of the marginal cost. This result indicates that it is optimal to pay the 
hospital a fixed sum T and then a fixed price for every person asking for 
treatment by entering its waiting list, and a zero price for the number of people 
actually treated.
This apparently counterintuitive result stems from the way demand was 
modelled. On the one hand, hospitals have an incentive to increase the quality
B , =  0
„ U r + h r(C  + v)U
B ---------------------------------
y \+ a  h hqx
(2.25)
Rearranging the equations", another way to express the result for By is
C + v r 
q r + h
(2.26)
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level of their service: they are paid on the basis of their demand and, given the 
assumptions, a higher quality attracts more people. On the other hand, however, 
more people demanding treatment translate into a longer waiting time, and this in 
turn acts negatively on demand. In order to counteract this effect hospitals will 
decide the number of people they want to treat, as the more patients are treated 
the shorter is the waiting time. In other words the adjustment towards 
equilibrium can be described as an adjustment towards an optimal waiting time; 
rewarding hospitals on the basis of their demand gives them immediate and 
direct incentives over q and also indirect incentives over*.
If only a price per case were paid, and not a price per person asking for 
treatment, then hospitals would treat the right number of people but at a too low 
quality level. If in order to give them an incentive to increase quality they were 
partly reimbursed for their costs, then they would not make the right effort in 
cost reduction. The results for these two last cases are derived in Appendix 2.1.
The payment of both a positive price per case and per demand would lead to the 
treatment of too many patients. This result will become clear in the next section, 
when the social cost of having people waiting and eventually dying is 
considered. 1
11 The result is obtained if in the F.O.C of the welfare function the derivatives of V  are expressed 
as U ,  and Uy, and in the hospital's F.O.C the same is done for the derivatives of y  (y ,  and y q).
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2.4 Extensions to the model.
The model developed in Section 2.3 is based on several assumptions, some of 
which have already been discussed. Three of these assumptions will now be 
relaxed, to see if and how they affect the results obtained. In particular, the 
following changes will be introduced:
1) Instead of considering that hospitals and patients have the same discount 
factor r for time preference, a different factor is introduced to discount 
patients’ utility when treatment is postponed.
2) The assumption of perfect competition is relaxed to see how the model 
behaves in the case of an oligopoly of hospitals.
3) Finally, the implicit assumption that social and private costs are the same is 
relaxed and the “cost of the loss” of patients getting worse or dying while 
waiting is introduced in the social costs.
2.4.1 Different discount factor.
It might be the case that people’s discount factor for time preference is different 
from that of hospitals. Calling the former 8 and the latter r, the objective 
functions can be re-written as
ytfi
\ y ‘ J
S+h
h
- ( C  + v)
( x. '
\  y ‘ J
(\ +  a ) (2.27)
H = B(x.y) - ( C  + v) ' U s
5+ h
(2.28)
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Proceeding as before, the following results are obtained
B =  0 (2.29)
B. =
U S  + h r(C + v)
1 + a  h hx
which is the same as
U S+h (2.30)
B> =
u . y
e-™[a(Ca +va) +
C + v
S  + h q (2.31)
yq yq
The result and its rationale are therefore the same as before. It is still optimal to 
reward hospitals on the basis of their demand, paying them a fixed price per 
person entering the queue; this is calculated in the same way as before. In this 
case, as can be seen from (2.30) or (2.31), an increase in 8  will have a positive 
effect on the price flv, meaning that a stronger dislike for waiting leads to a 
higher payment per patient to the hospital. Unfortunately, the calculation of the 
effect of <5 on the equilibrium is inconclusive. Intuitively one might expect the 
higher marginal revenue to translate into an incentive to increase x  and q, in 
order to increase y, possibly leading to higher equilibrium values of both quality 
and quantity. However, the outcome where either only x or q is increased cannot 
be ruled out.
2.4.2 Oligopoly o f supply.
The case is now considered of an oligopolistic market with a finite number m of 
homogeneous hospitals. Whereas the homogeneity assumption might still be 
simplifying, the hypothesis of a finite number of hospitals is quite realistic,
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especially for local market conditions. The case is modelled as a Cournot-Nash 
game, in which hospitals decide their quality-quantity mix at the same time, 
taking the others’ decisions as given.
This interaction between hospitals can be introduced in the model via a 
respecification of their demand function. In a symmetric case with m hospitals 
the demand of each hospital in equation (2.17) becomes
As a symmetric equilibrium is assumed, (2.32) can be equivalently rewritten as
Equation (2.33) shows that every decision made by hospital /' about its quality or 
quantity level will affect it both directly, through the effect on its demand, and 
indirectly, through the effect on the others’ market shares. Differentiating (2.33) 
with respect to x and q gives
Vi (2.32)
i = 1.....,m
and the total market demand is
h
(2.33)
The same procedure as before is then used (maximise the social welfare function 
and the hospitals’ utility function and equate their F.O.C.) but using the above 
expressions for the marginal variation of demand with respect to quantity and 
quality, because this specification explicitly takes into consideration the number 
of firms and their market shares. This gives the following results:
Bx = 0
in r+h x (r + h) r(C  + v)
m — 1U J (1 + a )  xy hy
This is exactly the same result of (2.25) multiplied by m/(m-l).
Thus again, in the case of an oligopoly it is also optimal to pay hospitals a zero 
price for the number of cases treated and to reward them instead on the basis of 
their demand. It is therefore only the price per entrant to be influenced by the 
number of hospitals on the market. As can be seen by differentiating (2.34) with 
respect to m, the higher is this number the lower is the price and viceversa, 
provided that m >2. That is, the result does not hold in the case of a monopolistic 
provider. This is quite intuitive, as the whole model works on the adjustments of 
demand. In the case of a monopoly demand is fixed, as patients do not have any 
choice as of where to go to receive treatment. Formally this means that both yx 
and yq are zero. From the objective function of the hospital it can be easily seen 
that it would provide too low a quality level, even though a positive price per 
case could induce it to treat the right number of patients.
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2 .4 .3  The s o c ia l  “co st o f  the loss" .
So far, the only costs that have been considered are the production cost of the 
hospital and its disutility. It is realistic however to consider that, from a social 
welfare point of view, the fact that people might get worse while they wait and 
eventually die has a cost, other than their own cost from waiting. In other words, 
not only people, but also society, are worse off the longer they have to wait; the 
very events of getting worse and eventually dying carry a cost, that includes 
rather unmeasurable as well as more measurable elements (for example the 
payment of benefits to people when they cannot work). Call this “cost of the 
loss” y. This has to be introduced in the social welfare function that the purchaser 
is assumed to be maximising. This means that social and private costs are now 
different.
Recall from footnote (9) that 
F(t) = I -  e'"
is the cumulative distribution of the probability of dying at time t. If y  is the 
social cost of the loss, the expected social cost today of having y persons getting 
worse between now and w is given by
y h y je Hr+h)'clt
o
From (2.35) the value of the social cost of the loss is
(2.35)
(2.36)
A new expression for the welfare function can now be rewritten as
37
(2.37)
Applying the same procedure as in all previous cases, the result is now different, 
i.e.
The value of the price per person asking for treatment (By) is the same as in 
(2.25), but in this case a positive price per case (Bx) is required, which is equal to 
the social cost of the loss itself.
To interpret this result it is necessary to analyse what effect the introduction of y  
has had on the equilibrium. To do so, let’s consider the following equations from 
the F.O.C. for welfare maximisation:
The effect that the introduction of y has had on the optimal values of x and q can 
be calculated by totally differentiating (2.39) and (2.40), which results in
Bx - 7
B U r + h r(C + v)U
y 1 + a  h hqx
(2.38)
W =X (2.39)
= jc - ( l  + a ) ( C ,+ v , )  = 0 (2.40)
4
(2.41)
[ l - ( l  + a ) (C ^  + vxll)]dx + [-(\ + a )(C qq + v w )]</</= 0 (2.42)
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In matrix notation this can be rewritten as
(2.43)
where H is the Hessian matrix of the second order derivatives of the welfare 
function. From (2.43) Finally get
From the second order conditions the determinant of the Hessian matrix is known 
to be positive, so that
> 0 always
d y
This means that the introduction of /always produces an increase in the number 
of patients to treat, whereas the effect on the quality level depends on the size of 
the cross derivative of the hospital cost and disutility function. To shed more 
light on the above, consider the cross derivative Wqx as calculated from (2.40); it 
can be seen that when
dx (1 + a ) 2(C„„+vw ) 
dy ~ |«|
(2.44)
d y
dq (l + aOn-O + aXC^ +v^)
d y ~  |" l
(2.45)
(2.46)
\then WXII>0, that is the marginal benefit of quality increases with the number of
cases and the sign of —  (obtained via the total differentiation of (2.40)) is 
dx
positive. The opposite holds in the case
1
\ +  a
(2.47)
This means that if (2.46) is true then an increase in the number of cases makes an 
improvement in quality more valuable to society. The increase in the optimal 
number of cases brought about by y will therefore lead to a higher level of 
quality. The opposite holds in the case when (2.47) is true. Another way of 
looking at this is via the behaviour of the average cost function. From the 
convexity assumptions of the total cost function made at the beginning, the 
average cost per case (C+v)/x is an increasing function of both x and q, that is the 
average cost of treating a patient gets higher the more patients are treated and/or 
the higher is the quality level.
The implication of (2.46) is that the average cost will tend to increase with 
quality less when the hospital treats more people. If instead (2.47) is true then the 
increase in the average cost per case will be higher the higher is the number of 
patients treated. In the first case, a social welfare function that includes the cost 
of the loss will be maximised by increasing both quantity and quality; in the 
second case, the increase in the optimal number of cases will lower the socially 
optimal quality level.
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Even if this last hypothesis might seem more reasonable to expect, the opposite 
cannot be ruled out a priori. This could be the case for example if in order to 
increase the number of patients to treat the hospital has to buy and use some 
particular equipment, or hire some specialised staff, and this has beneficial 
effects on the quality level of treatment that can be increased at a lower extra 
cost.
In conclusion, the social cost of the loss introduces a difference between the 
social and the private cost functions, and the optimal number of cases is 
increased. As a consequence, a positive price per case is now required to give 
hospitals correct incentives. The optimal price per entry in the waiting list is 
determined in the same way as before, and its value will depend on whether the 
optimal quality level has increased or decreased.
2.5 Conclusions.
The aim of this chapter was to develop a model for the identification of an 
efficient contract for hospital services, that is a contract that gives hospitals the 
correct incentives to minimise their costs and to choose the right quality and 
quantity of treatment. In particular, the work by C&M has been used as a basis to 
develop a model that explicitly takes into consideration the existence of waiting 
time, and the fact that this affects patients utility. The model assumes that quality 
is not enforceable by contract, nor can be easily or costlessly monitored. 
However, it is assumed that purchasers, the agents of the demand, correctly 
perceive it and thus respond to it. Costs are convex and known to the purchaser.
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sIn this framework the optimal solution is a prospective payment system that 
rewards hospitals on the basis of their demand rather than their output. A positive 
price per case would result in either the treatment of too many people (if 
associated to a price per demand) or in the choice of too low a quality level (if no 
price per demand were paid). A price per person demanding treatment gives 
direct incentives to quality and indirect incentives to the number of patients to 
treat. The equilibrium can be described therefore as an adjustment towards an 
optimal waiting time. The same result holds true when a different discount factor 
for time preference is considered, and in the case of an oligopolistic market. In 
the first case, the price is shown to be an increasing function of how much people 
dislike waiting, in the second case a decreasing function of the number of 
providers.
The additional payment of a price per case has been shown to be necessary when 
a difference between the social and the private cost functions is modelled. The 
social cost of having people waiting and eventually getting worse and dying is 
considered. This translates into a higher optimal number of cases treated, which 
in turn requires a positive price per case to work as an incentive.
The results of the model rely on the assumptions made about the observability of 
costs and the responsiveness of demand to quality. As seen in Section 2.1, the 
relaxation of either of these assumptions usually changes the results pointing 
towards more complex payment systems, some of which might include forms of
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cost reimbursement and not necessarily lead to the first best solution. Such 
extensions to the present model are left for future research.
A general conclusion that can be drawn from the theoretical analysis is that if an 
optimal contract can be devised, this is far from being a simple task. The reality 
of the actual contractual agreements confirms this complexity. Vast amount of 
resources, including the recruitment of specialised staff, were used by both 
purchasers and providers (Robinson and Le Grand, 1994; Fattore, 1999). 
Especially at the beginning, extensive use was made of simple block contracts, 
then substituted by “sophisticated” block contracts, which would define upper 
and lower thresholds of activity, agreements on the monitoring of performance 
and the possibility of renegotiations. Progressively the system moved towards 
forms of prospective payment, i.e. cost-per-case and cost-and-volume contracts. 
Broadly speaking these would reward the hospitals on the basis on the number of 
cases treated, although their level of detail would be extremely high. The 
properties of these contracts have been analysed by the theory, which pointed to 
some possible drawbacks especially (but not exclusively) as regards the quality 
of the service. Their major advantage would lie in their cost saving, or waste 
reducing, incentives, which were also one of the main principles guiding the 
reform. This particular efficiency issue can be empirically analysed, and this is 
the aim of the second part of the thesis.
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APPENDIX 2.1
The results of the model developed in Section 2.3 showed as an optimal pricing 
rule to reward the hospital for every person demanding treatment. In this 
appendix, the effects of choosing a different pricing rule are shown. The case of a 
pure cost reimbursement system is quite straightforward and is therefore omitted. 
Two other possible cases are instead presented: the payment of a price per case 
only, and the case of a price per case with partial cost reimbursement. As will be 
shown, both lead to sub-optimal results.
CASE 1: PAYMENT OF A POSITIVE PRICE PER CASE AND A ZERO 
PRICE PER DEMAND.
I f  the payment system to the hospital was set as a function o f the number of cases 
treated only, that is By=0, then the hospital would treat the right number of cases 
but choose too low a quality level.
The F.O.C from the maximisation of (2.16) and (2.18) become
r
-  (1 + cr)(C. + v .) - — (1 + a)(C  + v) =  0 ( Al l )
r
= [*-(l+a)(Cv + v J  -  f  =0
i y  i
(A 1.2)
(A1.3)
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_ . r  C  +  v
(C + v ) = -------------
q v r + h q
For the solution to be optimal it must therefore be true that 
r  C  +  v
1 + a r  +  h q
From equation (A 1.1) 
l + a r 'l ( r  +  h ) q  (l + a )(C T+ v x)
r ( C  + v )  r(C  + v) 
and therefore
x  r(C  + v) r(C + v)
1 + a  ( r  +  h ) q - ( \ + a ) ( C x + v x ) ( R  +  h ) q
i.e. the socially optimal quality level is lower than that chosen by the hospital.
CASE 2: PAYMENT OF A PARTIAL COST REIMBURSEMENT OF THE 
TYPE B(C) = B,+ (pC.
As the payment of a price per case as in Case 1 leads to too low a quality level, 
an alternative could be to partially reimburse the hospitals for their total costs in 
order to give them incentives to increase the quality level of the service. 
However, this solution does not lead to the first best either.
I f  the  h o sp ita l w ere  p a id  a  f ix e d  p r ic e  p e r  c a se  a n d  w ere  re im b u rse d  o f  a  p o rtio n  
(p o f  i t s  to ta l c o s ts  it w o u ld  n o t ch o o se  the rif>ht le ve l o f  e ffo r t in c o s t reduction . 
Let’s call for simplicity the discount factor z, so that
z =
'U \ r + h
/
'£ V
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The F.O.C can be written now as:
r + hW. = q - ( \  + a )(C x + vx) - - —{\ + a)(C  + v) 
h hx
z = 0
W ,[jc-(l + a )(C ,+v,)]z  = 0 
Wj = - ( l  + a)(C f  +v f )z = 0 
H x = Bx + <f>Cx -  z(Cx + vx) = 0
r(C + v)
H = < p C - z (c v + v , ) — .
q '  q(r + h)
= 0
H f = (pCf  ~ ( C f +v f )z = 0
(A2.I)
(A2.2)
(A2.3)
(A2.4)
(A2.5)
(A2.6)
Whatever value is calculated for fl* it is obvious from the comparison of (A2.3) 
and (A2.6) that the hospital will not choose the optimal effort in cost reduction 
unless (p=0.
In fact, from (A2.3) the optimal solution implies that
vf = - C,
which is >0 as v is increasing in/and C is always decreasing in f  
From (A2.6) instead
vf
<P~Z
Z Cf
(A2.7)
If (p>z then (A2.7)is <0, implying a negative effort in cost reduction. If qxz. then 
(A2.7) is positive, but as (cp-z)/z>-1 not enough effort is put anyway.
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CHAPTER 3
THE MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY
The general aim of this chapter is to provide an explanation of the concepts of 
efficiency and productivity, and to review the main literature contributions to 
their measurement.
Productive, or technical, efficiency is defined with respect to inputs (or outputs) 
levels, whereas cost efficiency is the result of a process of cost minimisation and 
it embodies also the concept of allocative efficiency which is related to inputs 
proportions, given the inputs prices. Because this thesis performs an analysis of 
productive efficiency, for reasons of space the focus of this chapter will be on 
technical efficiency only.
The chapter is structured as follows. The economic concepts of efficiency and 
productivity are discussed in Section 3.1. Sections 3.2 to 3.4 explain the different 
measurement techniques: data envelopment analysis is the object of Section 3.2, 
the econometric estimation of frontiers is in Section 3.3, with the particular case 
of panel data in Section 3.3.1, and Section 3.4 describes the issue of measuring 
technical progress and shifts of the frontier. Finally, the applications to the case 
of hospital services are reviewed in Section 3.5.
A general comparison between the methodologies is done in Chapter 6 with the 
conclusions, after the analysis of Chapters 4 and 5.
Productivity and efficiency are two entwined concepts; the former is a general 
measure of the ratio of output(s) to input(s), the latter entails a comparison of the 
actual (observed) ratio to an optimal one which is usually referred to as the 
“frontier”.
Following Koopmans (1951), in a multiple outputs - multiple inputs case 
technical efficiency is a situation such that it is impossible to increase even just 
one output without either decreasing at least another output or increasing at least 
one input; or, viceversa, it is impossible to decrease even just one input without 
either increasing another input or decreasing at least one output. In other words, 
it is the maximum attainable output given a set of inputs, or the minimum level 
of inputs required to produce a given level of output.
More formally let’s define the following'.
If a vector x e  R*  of inputs is used to produce a vector y e  R+ of outputs, then 
L (y ) = { x : (y ,x )  is feasible}  (3.1)
is the input requirement set, and
IsoqL(y) = {x: x e  L ( y ) M i  L(y),Ae [0,l)} (
E ffL (y) = {x: x e  L (y),x'e L(y),x'<  *} 1
3.1 The microeconomic concepts of technical efficiency and productivity.
1 See for example Lovell C. A. K. (1993).
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are respectively the isoqu an t and the efficien t su bset. The input requirement set 
identifies a feasibility set for the inputs, that is all the input levels that are 
sufficient, though not necessarily efficient, to produce the output vector y. In 
other words, it represents the production technology. The isoquant is the 
boundary of the input requirement set, and is defined in terms of radial 
contraction of the input points within it. When the production technology is 
represented by a well behaved, continuously differentiable function the isoquant 
is the same as the efficient subset (the frontier), and it represents the minimum 
input level necessary to produce a given output level. If that is not the case, like 
for example if the frontier is piece-wise linear, the isoquant and the efficient 
subset do not coincide. This is shown graphically in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2, for the two 
inputs- one output case.
F ig .3 .1 : P ie c e -w ise  lin ea r f r o n tie r , input m in im isa tion  c a se  w ith  on e ou tp u t a n d  
tw o  inpu ts ( x l  a n d  x 2 ).
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On the piece-wise linear frontier of Fig.3.1 the isoquant ABCD2 does not 
coincide with the efficient subset BC: a point like a' in fact cannot be deemed 
efficient as the same level of output could be produced by reducing the level of 
input x l ,  as for point C. The difference in the level of x 1 between a ’ and C  is 
called an input slack.
F ig .3 .2: C on tin u ou sly  d ifferen tia b le  fro n tie r , inpu t m in im isa tion  c a se  w ith  one  
o u tp u t an d  tw o  inpu ts ( x l  a n d  x2).
In the case of Fig.3.2, instead, the frontier is continuously differentiable and the 
input set is strictly convex so that the isoquant and the efficient subset are the 
same line EF. A case like that of Fig. 3.2 represents a typical well-behaved 
production function, like most theoretical neoclassical production functions, with 
positive marginal productivities of the inputs. The horizontal facets of the 
isoquant in Fig. 3.1 instead correspond to marginal productivities equal to zero 
(inputs strong disposability). The case of negative marginal productivities (or
2 For clarity of explanation: points A and D arc not assumed to be actual observations, but are 
mentioned in the figure to identify the isoquant.
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weak disposability, an assumption more rarely allowed for, also known as inputs 
congestion) would translate in positively sloped facets3.
In both figures the input requirement set L(y) is the area on and above the 
isoquant.
From an output perspective, similarly
P(x) = {>■: (*, y)is feasible} (3.3)
is the output set, i.e. all the levels of output that can be produced using a given
level of inputs, whether efficient or not.
lsoqP(x) = {ye P(x),tfy£  />(*),i?(l,°°)}
EffP(x) = {ye P (x),yY  P(x),y'>  y}
are the isoquant and the efficient subset. The isoquant is the boundary of the 
output set, and it is defined in terms of radial expansions of the output points 
within it.
Again, in the case of a well behaved, continuously differentiable production 
technology the isoquant and the efficient subset coincide, and in this case they 
represent the maximum level of output which can be produced from a given level 
of inputs.
A graphical representation is offered in Fig.3.3 and 3.4 for the two outputs-one 
input case.
3 A more detailed discussion of the disposability assumptions is in Cubbin and Ganley, 19 9 2 .
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F ig. 3 .3: P iece -w ise  lin e a r  fro n tier , o u tp u t m ax im isa tion  case  w ith  one in p u t a n d  
tw o  o u tp u ts  ( y l  a n d  y 2 ).
F ig .3 .4 : C on tin u ou sly  d ifferen tia b le  fro n tie r , o u tp u t m axim isa tion  c a se  w ith  one  
in p u t a n d  tw o  o u tpu ts ( y l  a n d  y2).
Similarly to Fig.3.1 and 3.2, on the piece-wise linear frontier the efficient subset 
HI is not the same as the whole isoquant GHIL, and a point as b ' is not efficient 
because more of output y 2  could be produced with the given input level, as for 
point /. The difference in the level of y 2  between b ’ and I is called an output 
slack.
In all cases the output set P (x) is the area on and below the isoquant.
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The above definitions thus identify the efficient frontier, whether that is 
expressed in terms of output maximisation or of inputs minimisation. Efficiency 
of a particular firm can be defined in terms of its distance from that frontier, i.e. 
by means of a distance function. The distance function was defined by Shephard 
(1953, 1970), and it is equivalent to the definition of efficiency of Debreu (1951) 
and Farrell (1957)4; it is defined as the equiproportionate increase (in outputs) or 
decrease (in inputs) necessary to reach the frontier, i.e. it is a radial measure.
Using Shephard’s notation, in the input minimisation perspective the input 
distance function is
(3.5)
where Dt > I . If D/ = / the observed firm is efficient, as it lies on the frontier. A 
value of Di >1 indicates inefficiency, measured by the radial contraction //A 
necessary to reach the frontier, which is equivalent to a [l-(I/A)]*I00 percentage 
change. In terms of Fig.3.1 and 3.2, it corresponds to the ratio 0a/0a’. The input 
distance function is linearly homogeneous of degree +1 and weakly 
monotonically increasing in inputs, and is invariant to changes in the units of 
measurement5.
4 In particular, the Dcbrcu-Farrcl efficiency measure is the reciprocal of Shephard’s distance 
function.
'  These properties of the distance function arc discussed, among others, by Shephard (1970) and 
Fare and Lovell ( I97H). For general reference sec Fried, Lovell and Schmidt, 1993.
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Similarly, in the case of output maximisation the output distance function is 
given by
where 0<D„<1. Again, if D„ =1 the observation lies on the frontier, if D„ <1 it 
lies below it and a radial expansion of //t? of the outputs is necessary to reach it, 
equivalent to a [(]/&)-l]*100 percentage change. Looking at Fig.3.3 and 3.4 this 
corresponds to the ratio Ob/Ob ’.The output distance function is homogeneous of 
degree +1 and weakly monotonically increasing in outputs, and is invariant to 
changes in the units of measurement.6
One thing has to be noticed before concluding. As already noticed, if the frontier 
is a continuously differentiable function then the isoquant and the efficient subset 
coincide, and in that case the radial efficiency measure coincides with 
Koopmans’ definition of technical efficiency. This is not true when the frontier is 
not continuously differentiable. In a case like that of point a of Fig. 3.1 (point b 
in Fig. 3.3), the radial measure of efficiency identifies point a ’ (b ’) which is 
inefficient because of the input (output) slack. A proper measure of (in)efficiency 
therefore requires some kind of adjustment. This problem and its solutions will
6 In the case of cost efficiency, the frontier is the minimum cost for producing a given level of 
output, and the distance from that frontier measures the excess cost of the firm. This includes 
both technical inefficiency (waste in inputs) and allocative inefficiency (wrong inputs 
proportions), which can then be disentangled. However, as said at the beginning, no more detail 
is given to the characteristics of cost frontiers for reasons of space, given that the thesis estimates 
production frontiers anyway.
(3.6)
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be discussed in the section on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), because the 
frontier that DEA estimates is piece-wise linear.
3.2 Data Envelopment Analysis.
There are two main approaches to the estimation of frontiers and the 
measurement of efficiency: the linear programming, non-parametric techniques 
of DEA and the econometric, parametric techniques. The former are usually 
deterministic, though some contributions to a stochastic version have been 
recently developed by the literature7. The latter can be both deterministic and 
stochastic, but as the lack of statistical noise is a strong limitation they are more 
commonly used in their stochastic version. As a consequence of these 
characteristics, they have opposite advantages and disadvantages, as will be 
discussed in the conclusions.
DEA8 is a mathematical programming technique that was developed by Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes in 1978 (the CCR model) to measure efficiency in the non­
profit sector. Other models have followed the original CCR paper, and they differ 
with respect to the envelopment surfaces used (the way in which the frontier is 
identified), the orientation or focus and so on. The characteristic of DEA models 
is that the frontier is calculated using linear programming, i.e. it is the result of 
the linear combinations (envelopment surfaces) of those observations (DMUs, 
Decision Making Units) that use comparatively less inputs to produce
7 See for example Olesen and Petersen, 1995.
8 Comprehensive reviews on DEA can be found for example in Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (1993); 
Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford (1994); Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998); Cooper, Seiford and 
Tone (2000). A discussion of its application in the public sector in Ganley and Cubbin (1992).
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comparatively more outputs. This piece-wise linear frontier reflects the best 
observed practice in the sample because the models are (mainly) deterministic.
A first general distinction to be drawn is between “orientated” DEA models, and 
“additive” models. The former provide a radial measure of inefficiency and 
require one to choose between an output and an input orientation; the latter 
calculate a summary additive measure of inefficiency and do not require any 
choice in orientation.
A simple orientated DEA model is the one first presented in CCR, and it can be
depicted as follows. Assume there are i= l..... N  DMUs which use the inputs
k=l,.....K to produce m=],.....M outputs. Under the assumptions of constant
returns to scale, convexity of the feasible set and strong disposability of inputs 
and outputs9, in an output maximisation perspective the efficiency of each of the 
N DMUs (in turn denominated as DMUo) is calculated as:
A ,i* , s* > 0 V i,k ,m
where 60 is the radial contraction for DMUo, A is a IxN vector of weights, .y*' and 
sm* are respectively the inputs and outputs slacks and e is a positive, infinitely 
small number.
(3.7)i=i
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The calculation is performed N times, once for each DMU. The efficiency of 
each unit is calculated in two stages as a radial measure 0  plus the necessary 
adjustments in inputs and/or outputs .s*' and sm*. In the first stage, the optimal 
value of 0  is calculated, and in the second stage the sum of any remaining slacks 
is maximised to properly identify the “efficient comparator” of the unit under 
observation.
Using the notation in (3.6),
0 = 1/D„ > 1
i.e. for an efficient unit 0 = 1 and for an inefficient one 0> l. The presence of the 
slack variables is a consequence of the fact that on the DEA piece-wise linear 
frontier, the isoquant and the efficient subset do not coincide. Looking at Fig.3.3 
the radial expansion 0 to point b identifies the projected point b \  but a further 
increase in output y2 is necessary to reach the Koopmans’ efficient point I.
In an input- minimisation perspective the DEA envelopment problem is:
In this case, the radial measure is given by z, and using the notation in (3.5) 
z=l/Di<l
‘ These assumptions can he relaxed (references in footnote 7).
(  K m ^
min z„ - e  + X  sm
V*=' yJ
(3.8)1=1
N
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i.e. DEA calculates the Debreu-Farrel measure of inefficiency, which is the 
inverse of Shephard’s distance function. In terms of Fig.3.1, the DEA radial 
contraction corresponds to the ratio Oa VOa. Again, a total measure of inefficiency 
for each unit is calculated in two stages.
Other models have followed the original CCR paper. Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (1984; BCC hereinafter) introduced the possibility of variable returns to 
scale (VRS). This is carried out by adding to (3.8) the additional constraint that
X4-1
which defines a convex hull, as opposed to the conical hull of the constant 
returns to scale hypothesis10 (CRS).
The hypothesis of non-increasing returns to scale (i.e. only constant or 
decreasing) can be modelled by imposing the restriction
s i
Fig.3.5 shows the difference between a VRS and a CRS frontier for the one 
output-one input case. The line Oc represents the CRS frontier, whereas acd is the 
VRS frontier. 1
111 This technically means that if no restriction is imposed to the X  then all supporting hyperplancs 
can pass through the origin.
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Fig. 3 .5 :  DEA f r o n tie r  w ith  c o n s ta n t a n d  va ria b le  re turns to  sca le , in the c a se  o f  
on e in p u t x  a n d  on e o u tpu t y.
By looking at the figure the following characteristics can be noticed:
1. Fewer units are efficient on the CRS frontier: in the figure, point c is 
sufficient to identify it, whereas on the VRS frontier more units are efficient 
(points a, c , and d). The VRS frontier envelops the data more tightly, which 
implies more units will be qualified as efficient.
2. As a consequence of the above, an inefficient unit under VRS has a lower 
inefficiency score than under CRS. In the figure, in an input perspective the 
distance of a point like b  from the CRS frontier is the segment b b " , which is 
bigger than the distance from the VRS frontier h b '. The segment b ’b ” 
measures what is defined as scale inefficiency: at the optimal scale of 
operation returns to scale cannot be increasing or decreasing, so the 
difference (if any) between the CRS frontier and the VRS frontier is 
inefficiency of scale".
3. Under VRS the measure of inefficiency (but not the ordering) varies with the 
orientation of the model. Taking again a point like b , the distance from the
6 0
VRS frontier in an output perspective is the segment be, which is bigger than 
the input measure bh’\ in the case of CRS by definition the segments be and 
hb" are the same length. The orientation of the model therefore matters when 
using a VRS perspective, and it raises questions very similar to those of 
endogeneity and exogeneity of variables in a parametric context (which 
variables the firm actually controls).
The difference between the VRS and the CRS efficiency scores shows the 
existence but not the nature of scale inefficiency. This information can be 
obtained by comparing the efficiency scores under VRS and NIRS (not in the 
figure)1 2 *.
Both the CCR and BCC papers, as well as other “orientated” models, calculate 
the slack variables after the calculation of the radial measure by the two-stage 
process outlined before.1' This method however has its own limitations14 15, among 
which is the fact that it is not invariant to the units of measurement. An 
alternative to the radial measure of inefficiency is provided by the “additive” 
model1'’, which replaces the radial measure with an additive measure that sums 
only the slacks.
11 The optimal scale of production should he the one that minimises the long run average cost 
curve, and at that level returns to scale are constant.
12 As the estimations of Chapter 4 will he done under the CRS assumption (for reasons of degrees 
of freedom) no further detail is given here on this particular issue.
1' Sec also Ali and Scilord (1993) for another second stage LP method for the measurement of 
the slacks.
14 For a general discussion of litis problem see, among others, Coclli e l  til. ( I99X) and Fried e l  til. 
(1993).
15 Charncs, Cooper, Golany, Seiford and Slut/, (19X5). See Charlies, Cooper, Rousseau and 
Semple ( I9XX) for a unit invariant version of the additive model.
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Another alternative to the 2-stage process of the orientated models is the 
“multistage DEA" proposed by Coelli (1998), which conducts a sequence of 
radial movements to identify the efficient peer of the unit under observation. This 
methodology has the double advantage of being invariant to units of 
measurement as well as preserving as much as possible the original input and 
output mixes, which makes the suggested changes for the unit under observation 
more realistic.
The assumptions of convexity of the feasible set, as well as that of strong 
disposability of inputs and outputs are very rarely relaxed16, whereas the 
possibility of having log-linear envelopment surfaces is performed by the 
“multiplicative” models as for example in Charnes et al. (1982, 1983). Finally, 
more recent contributions to the implementation of a stochastic DEA can be 
found in the literature17.
16 The convexity assumption is relaxed in Dcprins ft. til. 110X4) and Tulkens t'i til. (1990), where 
the convex hull is replaced by a tree disposable hull.
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3.3 The econometric estimation of frontiers.
The econometric estimation of frontiers17 8 is an approach that was developed out 
of a criticism of the econometric estimation of production functions19, well 
established since the early work of Cobb and Douglas. The estimation of a 
production function is based on the assumption that all producers in the sample 
are behaving efficiently, and that any deviation from the regression line is due 
only to statistical noise. In other words, what one estimates is an “average” 
production function in which the parameters representing the technique are by 
definition the same for all observations in the sample. The production frontier 
approach stresses the point that this might, and most probably would, not be the 
case. This new parametric approach then developed into different specifications, 
whose common characteristic is that the inefficiency component is modelled by 
an error term.
Even though the object of this chapter are the stochastic frontier models, 
for completeness and ease of explanation an overview of the deterministic 
frontiers will be given first.
In the deterministic frontier case, the general set up of the problem is to estimate 
y=f(x;p)D„ (3.9)
where y is the level of output, x is a set of inputs and P  a vector of parameters to 
estimate; f(x;p) is assumed to be smooth, continuous, continuously differentiable
17 For example an application to the electricity distribution is in Weyman-Jones (mimeo).
18 Comprehensive reviews of the topic can be found in Greene (1997) and in Kuinbhakar and 
Lovell (2000).
17 Obviously, the same goes for cost, or profit, or revenue functions.
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and quasi concave20. Finally, D„ is inefficiency: as in (3.6) inefficiency is 
measured by the output distance function, defined as the ratio of actual to 
efficient output, that is y /f (x ;P )= D „ < l
Empirically, this usually translates into the estimation of a log-linear function, 
which in the single-equation, cross-sectional case is
/«y,= a  + P' Inxt -  Uj (3.10)
i =  1......N
where N  is the total number of observations, P is a Kx 1 vector of parameters to 
estimate, y  and x  are defined as in (3.9) and u, = -lnD„.
Inefficiency is measured by the vector of i.i.d. random variables u„ independent 
of the regressors. From (3.9) and (3.10) it is clear that u, >0. In fact, using the 
definition of distance function and the notation from (3.6) one can rewrite (3.10) 
as
Inyi = a +  p ' Inxi + /«£)„, i= 1...... N (3.11)
where
0 < D 0<1 is the distance from the (output) frontier
D „= e u
and therefore
lnD„ = -u or -lnD„ = u
In other words, this error component must come from a non-negative 
distribution.
20 I.c. the properties ol a well behaved production (unction are assumed.
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This deterministic model was first proposed by Aigner and Chu (1968), and 
several contributions to the estimation of (3.11) followed their paper. One 
possibility is for example to adjust the results of an estimation carried out by 
ordinary least squares (OLS). OLS gives consistent estimates of all the 
parameters but the intercept. Gabrielsen (1975) and Richmond (1974) proposed 
two adjustments to the OLS estimation, respectively the “corrected least squares” 
(COLS) and the “modified least squares” (MOLS), both consisting of a shift of 
the regression line upwards on the basis of the calculated residuals. COLS 
adjusts the regression line upwards until the largest residual is 0. That is, the 
intercept in (3.10) and the OLS residuals are adjusted as
A A A
a *  = a+ max[n,]
' (3.12)
A A A
- u ,  * = n,-m ax[n,]I
MOLS makes an assumption about the distribution of n, and the adjustment is 
based on its estimated mean, extracted from the moments of the OLS residuals. 
Again, in terms of equation (3.10) this means that
a *  = a+ £[«,]
— Mi *  =  U i~  E [U i]
(3.13)
As a consequence, in MOLS some of the residuals might still be positive, i.e. 
some observations lie above the frontier (see Fig.3.6).
F ig .3 .6 :  E xam ple  o f  re g re ss io n s  p e r fo rm e d  b y  OLS, M O L S a n d  C O LS, w ith  on e  
in p u t x  a n d  on e ou tp u t y  ( in lo g s).
In both cases the frontier has the same parameters as the OLS regression line 
with the only exception of the intercept. This means that all producers, whether 
efficient or inefficient, are considered to have the very same technology; the 
ranking of units is the same as that of OLS, and the only difference is the 
absolute value of the distance from the frontier (the value of the adjusted 
residuals).
This implication can be too strong, and the problem can be overcome if (3.11) is 
estimated by maximum likelihood (ML). In this case a distribution function for «, 
has to be assumed to respect the non-negativity requirement, and it is therefore 
taken into account when the parameters are estimated. The possibility of using 
ML was first proposed by Afriat in 1972. Various distributions were 
subsequently discussed by others, like the half-normal and the exponential 
(Schmidt, 1976), the truncated normal (Stevenson, 1980) and the gamma 
(Greene, 1990). The characteristics of different possible distributions will be 
discussed shortly, as they are common to the stochastic frontier models.
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Apart from specific issues related to the distributional assumptions of the 
inefficiency component, all the deterministic models suffer from their very 
nature, as all deviations from the frontier are attributed to inefficiency, no 
account being taken of statistical noise, measurement errors or factors not under 
the control of the firm. In a way, this is the very opposite problem of estimating a 
production function: in one case all deviations are attributed only to noise, in the 
other they are attributed only to inefficiency. This limitation opened the way to 
the formulation and estimation of stochastic frontiers.
The stochastic frontier model was proposed independently and at the same time 
by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Battese and Corra (1977) and Meeusen 
and Van den Broek (1977). The idea is to introduce in the equation a stochastic 
component together with the inefficiency component. This translates into a 
composite error term given by their sum. Again in the single equation, cross 
sectional case this is
Iny, =a +/j’ Inx; +£, (3.14)
where x, y, i and fi are defined as in (3.10); the composite error term is 
e> = ( v, - u,) 
where
v, ~N(0, a?)
is the stochastic component, a vector of independently and identically distributed 
normal random variables, with a zero-mean and constant variance a'f.. 
Inefficiency is measured by the vector of random variables w, assumed to be 
independent of the v,.v and of the regressors.
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(a+P’ Inxj) is now the deterministic part of the equation, as in deterministic 
models v=0, and (a+ p’ Inxi+vi) is the stochastic frontier.
The composite disturbance £, resulting from the sum of statistical noise and 
inefficiency is asymmetrically distributed with a negative skew, its final 
distribution depending on the distribution assumed for Because of the
presence of a composite error term the use of OLS would give consistent but 
inefficient parameters’ estimates, as well as a biased intercept. This last problem 
could be overcome by using techniques like MOLS, but the problem of 
inefficiency remains, and for this reason, if the distribution of m, is known (or 
rather an assumption is made about it), ML estimation is to be preferred21.
As was anticipated for the deterministic frontiers, the most common distributions 
that are found in the literature are the half normal, the truncated normal and the 
exponential22.
In the case of the half normal distribution (Schmidt, 1976), «, is assumed to be 
the absolute value of a normally distributed variable with a zero mean, and then
£,= V, - Uj
v, ~ N(0,a,2) 
ui = \U(\
Ui~N(0,ou2)
21 As of the finite sample properties of the two estimation methods, so far a Monte Carlo 
simulation by Coelli (1995) is what can be found in the literature to prove the superiority of ML 
compared to MOLS.
22 A gamma distribution was first attempted by Greene (1980), and it showed computational 
difficulties. For more details on the literature about it sec for example Kumbhakar and Lovell
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The log-likelihood function of the frontier model, with its composite error term, 
is (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977)
A is a constant and 0  is the distribution function of the standard normal. The 
parameter A,23 embodies the influence of the inefficiency component, but as will 
be seen later a different, computationally more convenient parameterisation can 
be used, as in Battese and Corra (1977).
As observed by Stevenson (1980), a half normal distribution is equivalent to the 
truncation at 0 of a normal variable with a 0 mean. The case could be generalised 
to the truncation at zero of normal distributions with a non-zero mean, because 
the zero-mean could be an unnecessary restriction. The resulting truncated 
normal distribution depends therefore on whether the mean is positive or 
negative. More in detail for this case
(2(XX)). Some progress has been very recently made in Greene (2CKX)) by using a simulated 
maximum likelihood estimation, as opposed to the direct maximisation.
(3.15)
where
£ , = «  + /? In jc, -  In y,
and
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U,~N(/i, <5u2)
and the log-likelihood of the frontier equation is
lncr + — lntf + ln®f z E ] - f | - V
2
-InO ~M g.^ TI
2 - l 2 a crA a  _ J
(3.16)
where a, X and ® are defined as in (3.15).
Finally, another distribution for u, that still maintains the non-negativity 
requirement is the exponential one, as in Aigner et al (1977) and Meeusen and 
van den Broek (1977). In this case 
h(u() = h exp(-/jM; )
h,Uj > 0
and the corresponding log-likelihood is
L= N \n h  + — (h(T )2
2
In ~ £L - h a , + he: (3.17)
The choice of the distribution of u( obviously affects the estimation of 
inefficiency. In particular the half normal and the exponential distributions both 
have the mode at 0, which means that the probability is highest of having 
inefficiency effects equal to 0, i.e. to estimate firms as efficient. A more general 
distribution as the truncated normal doesn’t suffer from this problem. As the half 
and truncated normal distributions are nested models, with the former being 
equivalent to the latter having a 0 mean, the null hypothesis H(): // = 0 can be 
tested against the alternative hypothesis H/: JU *  0 by means of a Likelihood
21 The same notation as in the original paper has been used here; the parameter A. has nothing to 
do with that of (3.7) and (3.8).
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Ratio (LR) test, and so a choice can be made between the two models on 
statistical grounds. As is known, the LR test is specified as
LR = 2[ ^(H,)-^C(Ho)]~X2r (3-18)
where £  is the value of the maximised log-likelihood. This follows a y 2r 
distribution with r  degrees of freedom, where r is the number of restrictions (in 
this case r = 1).
This testing procedure cannot be used to compare the exponential distribution 
and the (truncated or half) normal one, because the models are non-nested. In this 
case, information criteria for choosing between non-nested models can be used, 
like for example the Akaike information criterion. This is based on the 
comparison of the values of the maximised log-likelihood functions, taking into 
consideration the number of parameters of each specification, in order to 
consider also how parsimonious a model is. The Akaike information criterion is 
specified as
AIC = -2 £  + 2n (3.19)
Again, dC is the value of the maximised log-likelihood and n is the number of 
parameters. The preferred model is the one with the lowest AIC value.
The possibility of making a choice between different distributions should 
obviously be welcomed, and the fact that this is not always a proper statistical 
test is a shortcoming. However, there is some evidence (Greene 1990; 
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) that the rankings of producers are not particularly 
sensitive to the choice made.
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For estimation purposes24 a useful parameterisation to measure the influence of 
the inefficiency component is that proposed by Battese and Corra (1977). This is 
done via the definition of a parameter y = o2J a 2 , instead of the X parameter used 
in (3.15). The corresponding log-likelihood for the case of a half normal 
distribution of u, is
1
2a1 M
(3.20)
and therefore
ye  [0,1]
A value of y equal to 0 means that all deviations from the frontier are due to 
noise, whereas a value equal to 1 means that they are due only to inefficiency and 
the frontier is actually deterministic. Testing for the significance of inefficiency 
is therefore testing for the null hypothesis H0: y = 0 against the alternative 
hypothesis H/: y  * 0. This can be done by means of an LR test. In this particular 
case, however, as the 0 value lies on the boundary of the parameter’s space the 
statistic follows a mixed x 2r distribution, and its critical value for a test of size 
(a) corresponds to that of a test of size (2a).
As regards the measurement of each firm’s inefficiency, which is the purpose of 
the whole exercise, the problem arises that what one is interested is u,, (and
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every firm’s inefficiency will then be exp[ u, ]) but the residuals of the
regression are instead e ,. So far, the best proposed solution to this problem is to 
calculate the conditional probability E[m,|£]; this gives an unbiased though 
inconsistent measure of /<„ because the variance of the estimate remains non-zero 
as it is independent of N24 5. A better estimate can be obtained in the case of panel 
data models, which will be discussed next.
3.3.1 Panel data.
The availability of a panel data set has some desirable properties for the 
estimation of a stochastic frontier. Three main advantages in particular are 
pointed out by Schmidt and Sickles (1984), all consequent to having several 
observations on the same cross sectional unit: no distributional assumptions on 
the composite error term are necessary anymore, there is no need to assume that 
inefficiency is uncorrelated with the regressors (though this is true only in the 
fixed effects model) and finally inefficiency can be estimated consistently if T—» 
°° (a benefit though that only long panel data sets show, which is not often the 
case).
The presence of a time dimension opens up different possibilities for the 
estimation of both the parameters and the inefficiency component itself. The 
literature on the various possible models is quite large on its own, but for the
24 Greene (1997).
25 For details on the possible estimators proposed hy the literature see for example Kumbhakar 
and Lovell (2000).
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purpose of this chapter the discussion will be kept fairly general, to provide an 
overview of the advantages and characteristics of different specifications.
In the presence of panel data, assuming parameters remain constant across cross
sectional units and over time, the model to be estimated is
lny„ = a+  fi' Inxn +£„ (3.21)
/= /......N
t= l,...,T
that is the N firms are each observed T times (for a balanced panel, but the 
analysis can be extended to unbalanced panels as well). The structure of £„ 
depends on the assumption made about inefficiency. If inefficiency is time- 
invariant then
£n = vu - u, (3.22)
whereas if it is time-varying then
£„ = v„ - u,t (3.23)
In both cases the stochastic component is v„, assumed to be 
v„ ~ N( 0 , <T v)
Starting with the case of a time-invariant inefficiency, like (3.22), the usual fixed 
effects (FE) or random effects (RE) models can be used. In the FE model, n, is 
assumed to be a fixed, producer-specific constant. No distributional assumption 
is therefore necessary about u„ and this can be correlated with the regressors 
and/or with the stochastic component, which are both advantages over the ML 
estimations discussed before for the cross sectional case.
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For a FE model, (3.21) can be estimated by least squares with dummy variables 
(LSDV), with an adjustment similar to that used in COLS to maintain the non­
negativity constraint on In particular, equation (3.21) is rewritten as 
Inyn =a, + f i ’ lnx„ +v„ (3.24)
where a, -  (a-u,) are the firm-specific intercepts. Once the model has been 
estimated the adjustment to ensure that the non-negativity constraint on the 
inefficiency component holds is
A A
a  = max[«r, ]
and (3.25)
u, = a - a ,
LSDV gives consistent parameters estimators as either N —■> °° or T—> and 
consistent estimators of w, if both N—> °° and T—» °°. This is an advantage over 
ML , although in practice T is often quite short.
The drawback of this estimation of FE is that the constant, producer-specific tr, 
can capture any other producer-specific, time-invariant characteristic, wrongly 
attributing it to inefficiency, but no time invariant regressors can be included in 
the equation.
If a RE model is used, u, is assumed to be a random variable rather than a fixed 
constant. In this case the ordinary least squares estimators are inefficient, and the 
model is better estimated by generalised least squares (GLS). This in turn makes 
it necessary to assume non-correlation between the m,.v and both the regressors 
and the stochastic component, although time-invariant regressors can be included 
in the equation, avoiding the problem seen for the FE model.
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For the RE model the equation to estimate is
Inyu =a* + ¡i' Inx,, +v„ -  u,* (3.26)
where
a* = { a-E[ u,]) (3.27)
and
«, * = (u, - E [ i i i ]  I (3.28)
Once all parameters in (3.26) have been estimated by GLS the «,* can be 
estimated from the residuals and finally
Again, this provides consistent estimators of n, as both N—» °° and T—> <*>.
Alternatively, if distributional assumptions can be made as well as the non­
correlation one, ML provides overall more efficient estimators than both FE or 
RE models, and consistent estimators of w, as T—> °°. The distributional 
assumptions about u, are the same discussed for the cross sectional models seen 
before, so no further detail is needed here.
It appears from the above that there are different advantages and disadvantages in 
using the three techniques, and there are no a priori, general reasons to prefer one 
to the others in absolute terms. The choice will depend on the nature of the data 
and on the assumptions that in every case it is reasonable to make.
A A A
u, ={max[M, *) (3.29)
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These main considerations also hold when inefficiency is time-varying. In this 
case, the main difference is that a functional specification to represent the 
variation over time has to be made, which is among the reasons whether a 
particular model will be best estimated by LSDV or by GLS or again by ML. No 
further detail is provided here about the different models found in the literature, 
with the exception of the model presented by Battese and Coelli (1992), which is 
the one used in Chapter 526. The functional form chosen for the inefficiency 
component in their paper is given by
u„ = Uiexpl-rHt-T)] (3.30)
where it, comes from a non-negative distribution (the model is estimated by ML) 
and T is the last year of the observations. This formulation expresses the 
inefficiency of each firm as a function of its value at time T. From (3.30) when 
t = T then it,, = A value of rp>0 means that decreases over time, i.e. 
efficiency increases, and viceversa when T]< 0. A value of T) = 0 means there is 
no time effect, and the model reduces to a RE model with u„ = u The 
hypothesis can be tested by means of an LR test.
This time-varying specification can be automatically performed by the software 
FRONTIER 4 .127, used in Chapter 5.
Finally, a possible extension to the models presented so far is worth mentioning, 
which is the issue of trying not only to measure but also to explain differences in 
(in)efficicncy. The first attempts to do that made use of a two-stage analysis, 
where the second stage would consist of a separate regression of the estimated
2,1 For a discussion of other panel data models, see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2(MX>) and the 
ref'erenees therein.
27 Coclli, T. J. (1996a), “A guide to FRONTIER version 4.1".
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(in)efficiencies on a vector of exogenous variables. This two-stage approach 
showed various econometric problems, so alternatives were proposed in which 
the inefficiency component would be explained by a set of exogenous variables 
estimated at the same time as the other parameters by ML. The work of Deprins 
and Simar (1989) was among the first in this area, with the estimation of a 
deterministic frontier. Others followed, like for example Kumbhakar, Ghosh and 
McGuckin (1991) with an application to the stochastic frontier context, and 
Battese and Coelli (1995) with a panel data set.
3.4 Technological change, shifts of the frontier and the Malmquist index.
When the efficiency of a set of firms is assessed over several periods of time, the 
question arises quite naturally of whether time itself might have had an effect on 
their behaviour. This is more so the longer is the time period, or if some relevant, 
external events took place during it. If no technological change had occurred at 
all, then one could estimate one frontier only and all recorded changes in the 
performance of the firms could be interpreted as changes in technical efficiency 
only. On the other hand, if this is not true, the frontier itself might have changed 
(usually shifted) over time, and separate estimations for every year are 
appropriate. It is interesting in this case to separate the changes in the frontier 
itself, i.e. technological change, from the changes in technical efficiency of every 
unit observed.
A change in total factor productivity (TFP) is a change in the ratio of outputs to 
inputs. The use of index numbers to measure this change dates back to the works
7X
of Fisher (1922) and Tornqvist (1936), that defined ratios between the (indexes 
of) outputs and the (indexes of) inputs of a firm at different points in time. Since 
the works of Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982a, 1982b), that decomposed it 
into various components, a very common way of measuring TFP change is by 
means of a Malmquist index (Malmquist, 1953). This is calculated as the ratio of 
distance functions, and so it assumes their estimation beforehand. This 
methodology has become very popular when efficiency is calculated by DEA2“.
The Malmquist index is a summary measure of the change in TFP of a given unit 
over time. This overall measure can be split up as the product of three different 
components: the change in technical efficiency (measuring whether the unit has 
moved closer to the frontier), the change in scale efficiency (measuring whether 
the unit has moved closer to the constant returns to scale facet of the frontier) and 
the shift of the frontier itself (measuring whether the unit has improved its 
production possibilities). This is calculated as ratios of distance functions. In 
more detail, let’s recall the definition of output distance function given in (3.6)
A value of l)„= I implies that a unit is located on the frontier, and a value <1 that 
it is below it. Let’s now assume that a given unit i that uses inputs vector x to 
produce output vector y, is observed over two different times, t and t+l. For 
simplicity the situation is represented for the one-input and one-output case, with
2* Some applications to econometric frontiers are reviewed in Grosskopf (1993) and in Coelli (’! 
a t. (1998). However, the model estimated in Chapter 5 does not allow for it.
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constant returns to scale in Fig. 3.7, where S(t) and S(l+I) are the frontiers at 
time r and t+l respectively.
Fig.3.7: Change of the frontier S (one output and one input case) between time t 
and t+1.
Unit i at time t is point a in the figure and at time /+ / it is point d.
Let’s now define the following:
D„' (x',y!) is the distance of the unit as observed at time t (i.c. using input vector 
x! to produce output vector y! ) from the frontier of time /, S(t). This corresponds 
in the figure to the segment ah, in turn the ratio ga/gb.
D,,/*' fjcr '.y f* 1) is the distance of the unit at time t+l from the frontier of time 
t+ l, S(t+I). This corresponds to the segment ¿//'(ratio hd/hf)
D j* ' (x'.y!) is the distance of the unit observed at time t from the frontier of 
time t+l: segment ac (ratio ga/gc)
D„! (x'*1. y ’*') is the distance of the unit observed at time t+l from the frontier 
of time /, corresponding to the segment ed (ratio hd/he).
xo
Given the above definitions, the Malmquist index for the particular unit 
considered is defined as
(3.31)=
/+i. /+i /+i,
D„i (x , >y, )
Dn‘{ x ; , y ! )
p* t / /+1 /+l \ r\ / / / / \A,, (*, ) f ) , „ ( x ,  -y, )
D /+l / /+! (+1 \ r» /+1 / t t \(Xj ,y, ) D oi (x, ,y, )_
which in terms of Fig. 3.7 is equivalent to
( h i ) (hd \ (  ga
U/ , he j
M ( hd \
{ h f j UcJ.
The term outside the brackets represents the change in technical efficiency, that 
is whether the unit has moved closer to its frontier. The part inside the brackets 
represents technical progress, calculated as the geometric average of the distance 
from the two frontiers. If variable returns to scale are assumed, the part outside 
the brackets can be split in turn into a change in the scale of operation and a real 
change in efficiency.
A Malmquist index bigger than I indicates that total factor productivity has 
increased, and viceversa for a value smaller than I. The specific changes can be 
interpreted in a similar fashion, with ratios of distance functions bigger than I 
indicating an improvement and viceversa.
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As regards econometric estimations, technological change is usually modelled by 
introducing a time effect among the regressors29. This can be in the form of a 
time trend or of dummy variables to allow for a different intercept for different 
years. In both cases the slope parameters of the regression equation are assumed 
to be constant, over time and across cross sectional units. The possibility 
however that the very shape of the production function might at some point have 
changed is an interesting one. This possibility is explored in Chapter 5, where a 
structural break is detected by means of a time interaction-dummy. This dummy 
takes a value of 1 for particular years and 0 else, and it is multiplied to all the 
variables (the jc„j ) in the regression equation, i.e. 
lny„ ~ P' lux,, +d + p ' Inx„ d +£„
where (3 and p are two Kxl vectors of parameters to estimate and d is the time 
interaction dummy. This means that the parameters of the function will be the 
vector P+p when d  = 1, and the vector (3 when d = 0. As the details on this 
cannot be separated from the analysis, to avoid repetition the issue is postponed 
to Chapter 5.
3.5 The efficiency of hospital services.
This last section will highlight the main issues and literature contributions to the 
estimation of efficiency in the hospital sector.
The estimation of efficiency in the hospital sector raises some peculiar problems 
especially as regards the definition and measurement of output (see for example
' 'Comprehensive reviews of different models are in Grosskopf (1993) and Coclli e l  a l. ( I99X).
McGuire, 1985). First of all, it is not possible to consistently measure the final 
output of hospitals, the improvement in health, so that an intermediate measure 
of it is required. This not only disregards the final aim of hospitals activity; 
isolating hospitals and their output from the rest of the health care system, it also 
fails to give any consideration to the linkages and interrelations within it, which 
are relevant to the degree of integration. The more integrated is the system, the 
less clear are the boundaries between all the services and the bigger the 
possibility of spreading health care among them, and this, in turn, makes it more 
complicated to talk about efficiency (Evans, 1981).
The main problem with the intermediate output is that it is not homogeneous, but 
varies widely across hospitals and even within each of them. Two main 
approaches to the homogenisation of output can be found in the literature 
(Tatchell, 1983). The service-mix approach measures output in terms of the 
services actually or potentially provided by the hospital, thus focussing on the 
inputs to identify the outputs. The case-mix approach, much more widely used, 
identifies the output in the number and (diagnostic) kind of cases treated by the 
hospital. These translate into the definition of different casemix categories, even 
though heterogeneity remains on other factors, like the severity of illness within 
each category. However, too detailed a level of output definition has the 
shortcoming of increasing greatly the number of parameters to estimate, so that a 
trade-off between precision and statistical efficiency is usually unavoidable 
(Butler, 1995).
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The presence of multiple outputs is not a problem for DEA, but it can be so in 
econometrics, as the production frontier models analysed before can be estimated 
only for the single-output case.
Three solutions can be found in the literature to overcome this problem
1) The estimation of a cost, as opposed to a production, frontier.
2) The use of index numbers.
3) The estimation of a distance function.
The first solution has been frequently applied in the literature. The estimation of 
a cost function has one variable only on the LHS, the total cost of production, 
and all outputs together with the input prices are on the RHS. When estimated as 
such, the measured (in)efficiencies will represent both technical and allocative 
(in)efficiency, but the two can be disentangled by estimating simultaneously the 
cost frontier and the factors share equations. There are two problems with this 
approach: the very high number of regressors (especially if one uses a flexible 
functional form) and the definition of input prices.
The second solution is very appealing when one is not interested in the marginal 
effects of the different outputs per se. The main problem associated with this 
approach is that of finding suitable weights for the construction of the index.
The third solution has appeared more recently in the literature, and it is the one 
chosen for the analysis in Chapter 5,(), where in particular the model proposed by
Some use of index numbers will prove necessary loo.
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Coelli and Perelman (1996) is used31. The discussion of the model is done in that 
chapter, together with some considerations related to the choice of a functional 
form for the frontier.
Coming to the empirical literature on hospitals’ efficiency, this has focussed in 
particular on the analysis of their costs. A more traditional approach, that starts 
with Feldstein’s seminal work (Feldstein, 1967), estimated what Evans defined 
“behavioural” cost functions (Evans, 1971), as opposed to the more recent 
estimation of “proper” cost functions (i.e. resulting from a constrained 
minimisation problem). The works using this second approach, mostly from the 
USA, are estimations of cost functions (Cave et al„ 1978; Wagstaff, 1989), often 
estimated simultaneously with the factor share equations to disentangle technical 
and allocative efficiency (Cowing and Holtmann, 1983; Conrad and Strauss, 
1983; Fournier and Mitchell, 1989). The estimation of frontiers is more recent, 
both for DEA and the stochastic frontier approach.
Given the object of this thesis, it is worth focussing attention on the analyses of 
the UK hospital sector.
The literature on the efficiency of the UK hospital sector was surprisingly not 
very rich before the reform (Wagstaff, 1988). McGuire and Westoby (1983) 
estimated a translog production function on Scottish, non-teaching acute 
hospitals, with a focus on the efficiency of the input-mix which showed the 
existence of an excess in capital expenditure and housekeeping services. Gray et 1
11 One application of this model is in Burns e t a t. (2000).
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al. (1986) analysed trends in factor inputs in Scottish hospitals between 1951 and 
1981, revealing a shift towards cheaper labour factor inputs.
An upsurge of interest on the topic was marked by the introduction of the reform. 
Soderlund el al. (1997) used a linear regression model (not a frontier) on a 
sample of NHS hospitals in England for 1992-1994, which revealed a general 
productivity improvement whose association with the changes to trust status 
remained however unsure.
A lot of the literature used the same Scottish data set as in the present work. For 
example Scott and Parkin (1995) used it for 1992/93 to estimate a translog cost 
function which highlighted the prevalence of constant returns to scale and 
economies of scope between different kinds of outputs (mainly inpatients and 
outpatients). Parkin and Hollingsworth used DEA on this data set for the period 
1991/92 to 1993/94. Their work analysed the strengths and weaknesses of DEA, 
especially as regards its sensitivity to different aggregation methods for inputs 
and outputs. No trends or indexes of productivity change were calculated.
The most similar work to the present one, to our knowledge, is Maniadakis el al. 
(1999) which used the same data set for the period 1992-1996’’’. Their analysis 
consists of the calculation of DEA-based Malmquist indexes of TFP, on a sample 
of 75 acute hospitals in Scotland. The paper also allows for a measure of 
quality” , and eoncludes for a worsening of it over time. Their general results are 
similar to the ones of this thesis, as regards the overall improvement in TFP
' Following the analysis started by Maniadakis and Thanassoulis (1997).
In particular, it is the survival rate after 30 days front discharge.
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which is mainly attributable to shifts of the frontier. Their calculated 
improvement is larger (+7%) probably because of the different output 
categorisation used (more emphasis is given to the outpatients, with only one 
category of inpatients) and for other statistical reasons discussed below. No 
separate analysis of the role of trusts is made, nor of the role of different inputs in 
explaining inefficiency. This translates into more optimistic conclusions about 
the effectiveness of the reform than the ones drawn in this thesis.
The differences and contributions of the present work are therefore worth 
mentioning here.
First of all, the sample size is different. The time span covers the whole duration 
of the reform. As regards the number of cross sections, the original total number 
(that is the total number of hospitals classified as acute) was 75, and this larger 
sample was used in the papers mentioned above. However, a closer look at the 
data disclosed a problem. Many of these hospitals, though registered as acute, are 
actually cottage hospitals; these are a very particular category as they are very 
small, do not perform any kind of surgery and have different staffing procedures, 
as they often rely upon local GPs. It therefore seemed rather inappropriate to 
compare them with larger, general hospitals, especially when using a 
deterministic technique. Moreover, when looking at the data series for this subset 
of the sample, they showed lots of irregularities and inconsistencies. The matter 
was further investigated by contacting the hospitals directly and it was realised 
that the data were very inaccurate for this part of the sample. For these reasons it 
was finally decided to remove these observations: even if this would have a cost
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in terms of degrees of freedom, it would obviously give more reliable and 
meaningful results.
Secondly, and maybe most importantly, the kind of statistical analysis performed 
is different. In the above non parametric papers, all general conclusions about 
trends in changes were drawn from the analysis of the average of the indexes 
results. As will be seen in Chapter 4, this can be inappropriate (and turned out to 
be so) if the distribution of the results themselves is not checked. DEA is a 
deterministic technique (so no noise is considered) and is very sensitive to the 
presence to outliers. If such outliers are not checked for and taken into account, 
the results can be biased and the conclusions therefore misleading.
Finally, also the stochastic, parametric approach is used, as the two techniques 
are quite complementary in terms of strengths and weaknesses. This is thought to 
make the analysis more reliable in terms of general results, and more complete as 
it opens up different possibilities. For example, the changes in the relative inputs 
inefficiencies and/or elasticities are calculated, the adoption of a different 
technology of production is analysed, none of which has been done before.
The next two chapters are devoted to the actual estimation of efficiency, using 
respectively DEA in Chapter 4 and the SF in Chapter 5. The comparison of the 
two methodologies is done in Chapter 6, together with the comparison of the
results and the conclusions.
CHAPTER 4
DEA AND MALMQUIST INDEXES ANALYSIS
This chapter performs an analysis of the changes in productive efficiency of a 
sample of 53 acute hospitals in Scotland in the period 1991/92 - 1996/97; the aim 
is to see whether the reform of the NHS, which in 1990 introduced competition 
for hospital services, has actually improved the efficiency with which hospitals 
perform their activity. The data do not cover the years preceding the introduction 
of the reform; however, the acquisition of trust status by hospitals, which 
embodies the full working of the internal market, did not take place all at once, 
so that the sample contains both trusts and non-trusts which can be compared.
The methodology used is the calculation of Malmquist indexes of total factor 
productivity change, based on non-parametric frontiers estimated by Data 
Envelopment Analysis.
Methodological issues have already been discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter 
therefore starts with the description of the data set, in Section 4.1. The overall 
change between 1991/92 and 1996/97 is the subject of Sections 4.2 and 4.3, 
devoted respectively to the analysis of the Malmquist index and the determinants 
of inefficiency. Year by year changes are analysed and discussed in Section 4.4 
and general conclusions are provided in Section 4.5.
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4.1 The data.
The data are a sample of 53 acute hospitals in Scotland in the years 1991/92 
(from now on referred to as 1992) to 1996/97 (from now referred to as 1997), 
that make a panel data set of 6x53 = 318 observations.
These data were obtained from the Scottish Health Service Costs statistics.
As regards the definition of the inputs and outputs variables, the following 
choices have been made (Tatchell, 1983; Butler, 1995).
Output is measured as the total number of cases treated in various specialty (or 
casemix) categories. The original data set is quite detailed, with many different 
categories and a main distinction between the patients who need to stay in the 
hospital overnight (inpatients), and those who do not (outpatients, day patients 
and day cases). This main distinction has been kept. The many categories of 
inpatients have been in turn summarised into three general groups in order to 
reflect at least some of the difference in the casemix of different hospitals. This 
translated into 4 output categories: 
qi= inpatients, surgery (total number of cases); 
q2 = inpatients, medical (total number of cases); 
q3 =inpatients, others (total number of cases);
q4= outpatients, day cases and day patients (total number of cases).
The inputs are defined by the following 5 variables
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xi=Total capital charges (£000);
X2 = Medical staff WTE (whole time equivalent);
X3 = Nursing staff WTE;
X4 = Other staff WTE;
X5 = Total number of beds.
The measure on capital comprises;
a) Depreciation on fixed assets;
b) Interest paid on money borrowed to finance any of the projects in a).
c) 6% return on capital (trusts only).
Capital is measured in £000, and it is deflated using the “Hospital and 
Community Health Services pay and price inflation values”.
The “other staff’ input includes professional, technical, administrative, clerical 
and all other staff.
The “whole time equivalent” is the number of staff expressed in relation to the 
standard weekly hours for a particular staff category.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report the summary statistics for the sample, respectively for 
the outputs and the inputs. The distribution of the data series was checked and 
they showed to be extremely asymmetric, with a very wide variation around the 
mean1. This can translate in the average being biased by the presence of some 
outliers and in turn be inaccurate to represent changes in the levels over time. As
1 For reasons of space the graphs of the distributions arc not presented.
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Ia consequence, an adjusted average measure is used instead, which includes only 
the observations within fj±2a (where ju and a  are the mean and the standard 
deviation of the distribution)2. For the same reason and for completeness also the 
median is reported.
As can be seen in Table 4.1, the average number of patients treated increased in 
three out of the four categories. In particular, the inpatients in the categories 
surgery and medical show quite a regular and steady increase, and the same goes 
for the outpatients and day patients, whereas the category “inpatients others”, i.e. 
all other kinds of treatment provided by the hospitals that require the patient to 
stay overnight, presents a negative trend.
This could be in line with the general expectation that hospitals might have tried 
to reduce the number of inpatients and/or the length of stay as much as possible 
for cost saving reasons, and resort to provide treatment outside the hospital or 
without the need of overnight stay (that is the need of a staffed bed). It can be 
guessed that this is easier on the category “others” which probably includes less 
serious kinds of illness.
As regards the inputs values. Table 4.2 shows that over time the levels of capital, 
medical staff and other staff increased, whereas the number of beds and of 
nursing staff decreased.
2 According to Tchchichev’s rule this is at least 75% of the population, a value that raises to 95% 
if the distribution is normal, or close to normal.
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The acquisition of trust status brought with it some accounting changes as 
regards the capital input, so part of this increase can be directly related to that. 
The pattern of change in the levels of this variable is quite particular though, 
especially for the unexpected decrease between 1995 and 19963.
Similarly, the increase in the “other staff’ category, which includes all non­
medical personnel, might be due to the hiring of administrative staff to deal with 
the new contracting issues, and/or to the hiring of less qualified personnel to 
substitute to the nurses.
The software used for the estimations is DEAP 2.1 (Coelli, 1996b). It estimates 
DEA orientated models and can measure the slack variables using the multi-stage 
procedure mentioned in Chapter 3. The software also calculates the Malmquist 
index of TFP, splitting it into its different components. As constant returns to 
scale will be assumed, for reasons of degrees of freedom, only the general 
measure of technical efficiency will be taken into consideration, with no 
distinction between scale and pure technical efficiency. 1
1 The suspicion of the value being due to outliers and/or errors in the data was checked for and 
rejected, as the pattern turned to be common to most units in the sample.
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Table 4 .1: Summary statistics for outputs: total number o f patients treated in 
every category.
m edian m ean st. dev. % ra te  o f
(a d j. average) ehange eh ang e"
Inpa tien ts
surgery
1992 3920 5256 4033
1993 3803 5507 4324 4.8
1994 4003 5584 4373 1.4
1995 5021 5585 4424 5.4
1996 5216 6073 4786 3.2
1997 5386 5896 4610 -2.9 2.3
Inpa tien ts
m edica l
1992 2516 4004 3543
1993 2956 4286 3838 7.0
1994 3575 4172 3643 -2.7
1995 3205 4374 3963 4.8
1996 3451 4878 4435 11.5
1997 3498 5385 4686 10.4 6.1
Inpa tien ts o th ers  
1992 2733 3150 3042
1993 2537 3161 2991 0.3
1994 2617 3042 2825 -3.8
1995 2611 2864 2729 -5.9
1996 1990 2786 2693 -2.7
1997 1848 2644 2562 -5.1 -3.4
O utpatients, d ay  
cases, d a y
pa tien ts
1992 73442 102321 88883
1993 73919 103724 93269 1.4
1994 76530 119965 108145 15.7
1995 73822 111872 101561 -6.7
1996 79158 124616 102702 11.4
1997 102866 122741 99861 -1.5 3.7
*  R ate o f  ch a n g e  be tw een  the  tw o a d ja cen t years. 
* *  G eom etr ic  m ean  o f  the  yea rly  changes.
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for inputs.
median mean
(adj. average)
st. dev. %
change*
rate of 
change**
C apita l (£000)
1992 973059 1117942 941880
1993 913825 1167298 1022602 4.4
1994 1327970 1296105 1049507 11.0
1995 1334898 1453971 1177822 12.2
1996 1180265 1262594 1065260 -13.2
1997 1380675 1301422 1090141 3.1 3.1
M edical s ta ff WTE
1992 567 606 538
1993 511 637 585 5.1
1994 662 651 556 2.2
1995 747 702 597 7.8
1996 779 737 632 5.0
1997 804 812 724 10.2 6.0
Nursing s ta ff WTE
1992 4148 4002 3051
1993 4113 3828 2875 -4.3
1994 4260 3896 2781 1.8
1995 4370 4008 2978 2.9
1996 3819 3884 2889 -3.1
1997 3758 3748 2779 -3.5 -1.3
O ther s ta ff WTE
1992 2152 2427 1927
1993 2140 2500 1957 3.0
1994 3004 2559 1901 2.4
1995 2986 2764 2136 8.0
1996 2925 2820 2279 2.0
1997 3034 2834 2289 0.5 3.1
Number o f beds
1992 325 336 247
1993 317 336 245 0.0
1994 336 333 230 -0.9
1995 296 320 229 -3.9
1996 303 291 206 -9.1
1997 295 301 222 3.4 -2.2
* R ate  o f  ch ange  be tw een  the tw o  a d ja cen t years.
* *  O vera ll ra te o f  ch ange  p e r  y e a r  is ca lcu la ted  a s the g eo m etr ic  m ean  o f  th e  percen ta g e  
changes.
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4.2 Overall change.
The first analysis performed is the calculation of Malmquist indexes of TFP 
between the two years 1992 and 1997, to have a general picture of the overall 
change that occurred between the beginning and the end of the reform, that is 
when more changes were introduced by the new Government.
The results are reported in Appendix 4.1, Table A4.1. These are the unit by unit 
indexes respectively of the change in technical efficiency (whether the unit has 
moved closer to the new frontier), of technical progress (which measures the 
positive or negative shift of the frontier) and finally the change in total factor 
productivity (the product of the technical change and the total efficiency change).
Pure and scale efficiency are not considered because a constant returns to scale 
orientation was chosen, for reasons of degrees of freedom. The suspicion was 
that a variable returns to scale hypothesis would have been too demanding for the 
given sample size, therefore making the results more questionable.
This was confirmed by the fact that under the VRS hypothesis 80% of the 
hospitals were deemed as efficient (very little discriminatory power). 
Consequently, the analysis concentrates on the TFP change as explained by the 
total efficiency change and the change in technical progress.
Coming to the analysis of the results. Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show the 
distribution of the index values.
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Figure 4.1: Frequency distribution o f the indexes of efficiency change.
eff.92-97
0.8 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
Figure 4.2: Frequency distribution o f the indexes of technical progress.
tech. 92-97
Figure 4.3: Frequency distribution o f the Malmquist indexes ofTFP.
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The values are concentrated around a central point with the exception of very 
few of them (in general two units, though not always the same ones) that appear 
as outliers in the distribution. If the average value of the index is calculated, this 
would be biased by the outliers, and therefore not representative of the average 
change in hospitals’ performance.
In order to have a measure of central tendency, to see whether hospitals have 
improved or not their performance, an adjusted average is calculated again, by 
excluding as outliers the observations outside the range p  ± 2(7.
The results are shown in Table 4.3, and more detail is provided in Table 4.4, 
where hospitals are divided into three categories according to whether they 
decreased, increased or did not change their performance.
Table 4.3: Malmquist index results, 1992-1997 (adjusted average).
Adj. average
Efficiency change 0.99
Technical change 1.045
TFP 1.03
Table 4.4: Proportion o f hospitals (excluding the outliers) into every category o f
change.
Eff.change Tech.change TFP
decreased 37% 34% 37%
same 37% 0% 0%
increased 26% 66% 63%
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Table 4.3 indicates an average 3% improvement in hospitals TFP, mainly 
attributable to a 4.5% improvement in technical possibilities, which is confirmed 
by the one-to-one correspondence between the improvement in the frontier and 
the increase in TFP4.
This means that by adopting new techniques and/or by overall improving the old 
ones (i.e. keeping the same inputs mix but lowering the ratio of inputs to 
outputs), hospitals have shifted the output frontier upwards, or the isoquant 
inwards.
A higher frontier is therefore the probable reason of the worsening of the 
technical efficiency measure, which scores an average —1%. This results from 
37% of the sample being further away from the new, higher, frontier. This 
negative change is not very big though, and if at the beginning 57% of the 
sample is efficient, 49% is at the end, with the number of efficient hospitals 
falling from 30 to 26.
The increase in the number of inefficient units is the main reason of this 
worsening: the distance from the frontier increases, with the average radial 
inefficiency going from 0.93 to 0.92, but the average of the inefficient hospitals 
only remains the same (0.84).
Whether the improvement in technical possibilities is due to the adoption of new 
and better techniques or to a better use of the old ones cannot be said at this 
stage, as DEA does not estimate a production function. It can however be
4 See Appendix 4.1, Table A4.1.
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deduced from the analysis of the determinants of inefficiency and from the year- 
by-year changes, as will be seen later on.
4.3 The determinants of inefficiency.
An interesting thing to check is whether the determinants of inefficiency changed 
in the two years considered. DEA was therefore performed separately for 1992 
and 1997, again under the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, and the 
suggested inputs reductions for the hospitals deemed inefficient were checked.
The calculation was made adding to each unit’s radial measure its specific slacks 
and then averaging these new values out. The results are shown in Table 4.5. 
Again, an adjusted average measure is preferred because some values can be 
considered as outliers: not only the deterministic nature of the methodology casts 
some doubts on calculated wastes of, say, 80%, but also in any case they are 
much higher than the others.
The columns in the table report the (adjusted) average suggested input reductions 
for 1992 and 1997 and the difference between the two years; their total average is 
in the last row.
The average level of inefficiency (i.e. of suggested input reductions) increases 
between the two periods, though not by a great amount (+1.2%). The ranking 
instead changes quite a lot, which can be an indication of a change in techniques.
i oo
Table 4.5: Average suggested inputs reductions, including the slacks.
1992 1997 Change
capital 19 25 6
medical staff 15 16 1
nursing staff 18 19 1
other staff 22 27 5
beds 21 14 -7
average 19 20.2 1.2
In 1992 the variable “other staff’ and the number of beds are the most wasted 
inputs among hospitals, followed by capital and nursing staff, whereas the 
medical staff is (and remains) the least. In 1997 instead capital becomes one of 
the main determinants of inefficiency, again with the “other staff’ variable, 
whereas the number of beds becomes one of the least wasted ones, and the only 
input whose use improves instead of worsening over the time period.
One of the effects of the reform, well known also to the general public via the 
news, was in fact the reduction in the number of beds (see Table 4.2), with 
consequent ward closures in some cases. This is therefore the probable reason 
why the input contributes the least to inefficiency at the end, and its calculated 
waste diminishes.
As regards the capital and “other staff’ variables, their levels increase over time, 
they become the main determinants of inefficiency at the end of the time period 
and also show the biggest increase in inefficiency level among hospitals.
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One interpretation of the above results could be the existence of some 
substitutability between capital and beds, in the sense that the adoption of more 
capital intensive forms of treatment reduces the need of overnight stay and 
therefore of beds. This could be reason of the “switch” in the position of the two 
inputs as determinants of inefficiency, and could point to a possible 
“overcapitalisation” by hospitals. Another reason of the increase in the capital 
inefficiency could be the investment in information technology that hospitals 
made in order to deal with the new contracting issues (Fattore, 1999), as this 
would not be directly linked to the treatment of patients. However, the increase 
in the capital level is also partly due to the change to trust status, which made the 
hospitals owners of their assets with consequent accountancy changes.
As regards the “other staff’ variable, this always contributes most of the 
inefficiency, but this contribution suffers one of the biggest increases. One 
reasonable explanation of it could be the increased administrative staff made 
necessary to deal with the new contracting issues; hospitals were not used to 
them and it is possible for this change to have been inefficient. Another 
possibility is that the reduction in nursing staff might have led to the transfer of 
some of their duties over cheaper but less qualified (therefore more inefficient) 
staff. A pattern towards the use of cheaper labour inputs in Scottish hospitals was 
discovered by others (Gray et al., 1986), and this might have been reinforced by 
the financial concerns of the reform.
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The medical staff variable, though recording one of the main increases in level 
(see Table 4.2) remains as the most efficiently used input across the hospitals, 
and similarly does the nursing staff.
Some first conclusions can be drawn at this stage. A general comparison between 
the beginning and the end of the reform time shows hospitals improving their 
production possibilities and shifting the frontier upwards, by adopting different 
techniques and/or improving the old ones. The higher frontier, more difficult to 
reach, increases the number of inefficient hospitals (30 vs. 26) which is the 
reason of the increase in the overall average inefficiency level, that raises from 
7% to 8% respectively without considering the slacks. When only inefficient 
hospitals are considered, the radial inefficiency measure is 0.84 in both years, 
that is an average 16% optimal reduction in inputs, and it increases from 19% to 
20.2% when also the slacks are considered.
The analysis of the slacks and consequent suggested average input reductions 
shows an evident change in the contribution of different inputs to inefficiency. 
This gives more support to the hypothesis that technological change has occurred 
during time, with hospitals apparently becoming more capital intensive and 
reducing the use of beds.
To see whether these general considerations are sound it is necessary to look at 
the year-by-year changes, which is the subject of the next paragraphs.
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4.4 Year by year changes.
In this part of the work the efficiency analysis is done for all the years from 1992 
to 1997. Some first general information about the performance between 1992 and 
1997 can be provided by the separate estimation of DEA for each year in the 
sample. A summary of the results is provided by Table 4.65, which shows for 
every year the average efficiency score of all hospitals (“efficiency 1”, a general 
performance measure), the average efficiency score of inefficient hospitals only 
(“efficiency 2”), the number of efficient hospitals, the number of trusts and the 
number of trusts that are efficient.
Table 4.6: DEA results for each year.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
efficiency l 1 0.93 0.97 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.92
efficiency 22 0.84 0.87 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.84
n. cff. units3 30 39 27 32 27 26
no. trusts4 0 3 19 46 53 53
no. eff. trusts5 0 3 10 28 27 26
1 Average radial DEA measure, calculated over the whole sample.
2 Average radial DEA measure, calculated for inefficient hospitals only.
'Total number of efficient units (i.c. units on the frontier).
4 Total number of hospital trusts.
5 Total number of efficient hospital trusts (i.c. hospital trusts on the frontier)
The number of efficient hospitals varies over time, and accordingly so does the 
general efficiency level (“efficiency 1”), which is the average radial DEA
5 The complete, unit-by-unit results are in Appendix 4 .1, Tables A4.2 to A4.6.
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measure calculated over the whole sample. The average “real” inefficiency 
(“efficiency 2”) follows a similar pattern: the values are obviously lower (as only 
inefficient units are considered), and they reach a minimum in 1994 (0.82, a 
radial inputs inefficiency of 18%). The last row shows how many of the efficient 
hospitals are trusts.
When the first wave of change in status takes place in 1994, with 16 new trusts, 
only 7 are actually 100% efficient. The number of efficient hospital trusts 
necessarily increases in 1995 as almost the entire sample has undergone the 
change.
More detailed information about the changes over time is given by the 
calculation of Malmquist indexes of total factor productivity on all the year pairs. 
The results are shown in Table 4.7 where again an adjusted average is used as a 
measure of central tendency for the reasons explained before.
Table 4.7: Malmquist index results (adjusted average), 1992 to 1997.
Eff.change Tech.change TFP
1992-93 1.026 0.991 1.038
1993-94 0.948 1.075 1.016
1994-95 1.034 0.938 0.966
1995-96 0.985 1.021 1.011
1996-97 0.993 1.017 1.001
geomean 0.997 1.007 1.006
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The results indicate a little but quite steady increase in TFP of 0.6% per year, so 
a total improvement of 3% as before. This results from average shifts of the 
frontier of a 0.7% a year (3.5% in total) and a worsening of technical efficiency 
of -0.3% a year (-1.5% in total).
The results are better understood looking at Table 4.8, which reports the number 
of hospitals in each category of change, and Figure 4.4, that reproduces the same 
information of Table 4.7 but expressing the changes in percentage terms, to more 
clearly represent their pattern over time.
Table 4 .8 : N um ber o f hosp ita ls  in  each category o f  change, 1992 to  1997.
EfT.change Tech.change TFP
1992-1993 decreased 4 25 16
same 27 1 1
increased 22 27 36
1993-1994 decreased 25 12 22
same 25 0 0
increased 3 41 31
1994-1995 decreased 2 43 33
same 26 0 0
increased 22 10 20
1995-1996 decreased 18 23 27
same 23 0 0
increased 12 30 26
1996-1997 decreased 17 24 27
same 23 0 0
increased 13 29 26
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Figure 4.4: Malmquist index results expressed in % terms, 1992 to 1997.
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The tables and figure reveal an oscillatory pattern, with major changes taking 
place at the beginning and then smoothing down towards the end; the shifts of 
the frontier and the changes in efficiency present such pattern, as they both 
alternate increases with decreases in every year pair and are also opposite to one 
another. That is, an improvement in techniques between two years is 
accompanied by higher inefficiency and especially for 1993/94 and 1994/95 is 
followed by the opposite phenomenon the next year. This oscillatory pattern 
translates into a little but steady improvement in TFP, as noted above.
The following interpretation seems appropriate.
As regards the opposite pattern of the shifts of the frontier and the change in 
technical efficiency, this is attributable to the fact that a higher (lower) frontier is 
more difficult (easy) to reach. This is confirmed by Figure 4.5, which plots the
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number of hospitals that face a positive shift of the frontier against those that 
worsen their efficiency. The two indexes also have a correlation of -0.85, which 
further confirms the idea.
F igu re  4 .5 : N um ber o f hosp ita ls  fa c in g  a h ig h e r fro n tie r  and num ber o f hosp ita ls  
w orsening th e ir tech n ica l e ffic iency.
The shifts of the frontier itself, and the fact that the oscillatory pattern takes place 
especially between 1993 and 1994 and between 1994 and 1995, which are the 
years of the major change to trust status, are interpreted as an indication of a 
change in techniques, as explained below. This is confirmed also by the inputs’ 
inefficiencies analysis, as will be shown shortly.
Let’s recall that the shift of the frontier is an index: it is the average of the 
indexes measuring the distance between the production possibilities of two years 
unit by unit, therefore technique by technique, and techniques might change. 
1994 is the year in which the first trust wave takes place, with the number of 
hospital trusts raising from 3 to 19. The hypothesis is that the change to trust 
status might involve a change in the input mix and/or an adjustment, such that 
hospitals’ productivity could be lower. I
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When looking at the unit by unit efficiency scores for 1994, it turns out that the 
majority of hospital trusts is not 100% efficient (see also Table 4.6), which 
means they are not the main contributors to the positive shift, but they face a 
higher frontier and score a worsening in efficiency score when compared with 
the previous year.
In 1995, 27 more hospitals change status, which is half of the sample and raises 
the number of hospital trusts to 46. If the hypothesis of a change in techniques 
and a slow down in productivity were correct, given the very high number of 
new units, this would show in a worsening of the frontier, which is what 
happens. The lower frontier in turn explains the increase in the efficiency index. 
Once the major changes have taken place the pattern smoothes down.
The hypothesis of a change in techniques is confirmed by the analysis of the 
relative inputs inefficiencies. This is done as previously, by calculating the 
(adjusted) average inputs reductions taking into account also the slacks, and not 
only the radial measure. The results are reported in Table 4.9 and shown in Fig. 
4.6. The first five rows of Table 4.9 are the suggested inputs reductions when 
also the slacks are considered, and the last row is their average.
As can be seen in Table 4.9, from 1994 the ranking of inputs changes, with 
capital and other staff becoming the most wasted inputs and the number of beds 
becoming instead one of the least wasted ones, similarly to what was observed in 
the previous section.
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Table 4.9: Average % suggested inputs reductions, including the slacks.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
capital 19 20 31 34 34 25
medstafT 15 13 25 15 14 16
nurstaff 18 14 22 18 17 19
othcrstaff 22 25 32 25 26 27
beds 21 17 22 18 20 14
average 19 18 26 22 22 20
Figure 4.6: Average % suggested inputs reductions, including the slacks.
□ cap
■ med
□ nur
□ oth
■ bed
It is also interesting to notice (see Figure 4.6) that the average levels are much 
closer to one another at the beginning and at the end of the time considered, 
whereas quite a wide variation is shown for the years 1994 to 1996, which are the 
years of the change to trust status.
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This confirms the hypothesis again: the efficient hospitals with respect to which 
the inefficiencies are calculated are not all trusts (Table 4.6), so they have not all 
experienced the change in technology, i.e. in the input mix, whereas when all 
hospitals have changed status the frontier is more homogeneous in terms of 
techniques, and the average inefficiency levels get closer again (the “efficient 
peers” all have more similar techniques).
The analysis therefore confirms the idea that technological change has occurred 
during the time considered, which is associated to the change in trust status. This 
change in input mix and the probable adjustment to the new situation translates 
into a slowdown in productivity growth for the units concerned, although overall 
productivity increases (see section 4.2)6.
Finally the characteristics of the efficient hospitals are checked for, in particular 
to see whether the hospitals which first turn into trusts (i.e. in 1993 and 1994) are 
more efficient than the others. This is a subset of 19 hospitals, as shown in Table 
4.6. The non-parametric equivalent to a t-test7 of the difference of means is 
conducted (the Mann-Whitney test) to compare their average efficiency over 
time with the average efficiency of the rest of the sample. The null hypothesis 
that the means are the same cannot be rejected, not surprisingly as they both have 
an index of 0.93.
4 The overall growth in TFP and the shifts of the frontier appear from the overall analysis of 
paragraph 4.2, as well as from the calculation of Malmquist indexes between different year pairs 
(1993 and 1995, or 1993 and 1996). Presentation of these last results was considered redundant 
and therefore not included in the text.
This is necessary because the inefficiency scores are hounded between 0 and I, so not even 
asymptotically they could be normally distributed, which is a necessary assumption for the t-test.
The unit-by-unit DEA results show instead a subset of 15 hospitals which are 
always 100% efficient, only 5 of which change status at the beginning. The test 
on the equality of means as one might expect this time leads to the rejection of 
the null hypothesis8.
It can therefore be concluded that trust status is not significant in determining 
efficiency and performance improvements, not even when the logic is reversed, 
as it is not true that most efficient hospitals would turn into trusts first, the others 
eventually following them.
4.5 Conclusions.
The results of the analysis of this chapter can be summarised as follows.
A general overview of the changes between 1992 and 1997, i.e. the beginning 
and the end of the reform, shows a 3% improvement in TFP, due to a 4.5% 
improvement in the frontier. Probably as a consequence of the higher frontier, 
technical efficiency worsens by -1%, with the number of efficient hospitals 
reducing from 30 to 26.
The new, higher frontier is characterised by different inputs inefficiencies, a 
suggestion that the technology of production might have changed, with hospitals 
moving towards more capital intensive techniques and reducing instead the waste 
in the use of the beds input.
" The tests have been performed both on the average inefficiency over time of each hospital (53 
observations) and on the whole vector of inefficiencies (3IX observations) and they lead to the
These results are confirmed by the yearly analysis, which concentrates on the 
changes taking place between each year pair. TFP increases by 3%, again 
because of improvements in the technology of production (+3.5%), whereas 
technical efficiency worsens by -1.5%. An opposite oscillatory pattern of the 
changes in the frontier and those of technical efficiency is revealed, especially in 
the two years of the major change in status. These years are also characterised by 
the beginning of the change in technology of production described above, which 
can therefore be considered a direct effect of the reform: the change to trust 
status brought with it a change in the way hospitals would provide their services. 
As will be seen in Chapter 5, also the kind of services provided would change.
However, a link between the new status and a higher efficiency level cannot be 
proved. Trusts sometimes are on the frontier and sometimes are not, and not even 
the first wave ones are such because of a better performance compared to the 
others. The only effect that can be said with certainty is the change in the 
techniques of production: when introduced the adjustment slows down hospitals’ 
productivity, although overall productivity over time increases.
Naturally, several limitations arise from the very nature of non-parametric 
estimations, especially from its strong dependency on the actual observations 
which makes the results less reliable and more sensitive to outliers.
very same results.
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For this reason, in the next chapter the estimations will be carried using a 
stochastic, parametric approach. This will enable also to deepen some of the
issues related to the characteristics of the technology of production.
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APPENDIX 4.1
Table A4.1: Malmquist index results, overall analysis comparing 1992 and 1997.
unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP
1 0.986 l.l 1.085 28 1 1.009 1.009
2 1 1.143 1.143 29 1 0.937 0.937
3 0.852 1.264 1.078 30 1 1.015 1.015
4 0.898 1.161 1.042 31 1 0.707 0.707
5 0.951 1.168 1.111 32 0.9 0.928 0.836
6 0.842 1.295 1.091 33 1.066 1.133 1.208
7 1.065 1.254 1.335 34 0.847 1.205 1.021
8 1 0.939 0.939 35 0.958 1.082 1.036
9 0.876 0.963 0.844 36 1.038 1.224 1.269
10 0.874 1.097 0.959 37 1.054 0.96 1.012
11 1.06 0.978 1.036 38 1.03 1.037 1.068
12 1 1.02 1.02 39 0.944 1.018 0.96
13 1 1.019 1.019 40 1.202 1.032 1.241
14 0.966 1.07 1.033 41 0.972 1.015 0.986
15 0.887 1.132 1.004 42 1 1.001 1.001
16 1 0.987 0.987 43 1.042 1.044 1.088
17 1 1.139 1.139 44 1.064 1.143 1.216
18 0.802 1.039 0.834 45 1.214 1.086 1.319
19 0.849 0.816 0.692 46 0.641 0.901 0.577
20 1 1.128 1.128 47 1 0.988 0.988
21 1 1.002 1.002 48 1.016 1.02 1.036
22 1 0.942 0.942 49 1 0.991 0.991
23 1.249 1.017 1.27 50 0.98 0.992 0.972
24 0.969 0.846 0.82 51 0.744 0.914 0.681
25 1 1.193 1.193 52 1.961 0.881 1.728
26 1 1.141 1.141 53 1 0.893 0.893
27 1.317 1.671 2.2
Unit by unit results of the Malmquist index: efficiency change, technical change and total factor
productivity change.
T able A 4 .2 :  M a lm q u ist index re su lts  f o r  1992-1993 .
unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP
1 1.034 1 ,(K)7 1.042 28 1 1.03 1.03
2 1 1.006 1.006 29 1 1.015 1.015
3 1 1.026 1.026 30 1 1.077 1.077
4 1 1.05 1.05 31 1 0.815 0.815
5 1.002 0.991 0.993 32 1.015 1.016 1.032
6 1 1.048 1.048 33 1.058 0.947 1.002
7 1.065 1.014 1.08 34 1.032 1.054 1.088
8 1 1.044 1.044 35 1.023 1.016 1.04
9 1 0.988 0.988 36 1.095 0.949 1.039
10 1 0.991 0.991 37 1.054 1.013 1.067
11 1.052 1.004 1.056 38 1.03 0.981 1.01
12 1 1.141 1.141 39 1 0.914 0.914
13 1 1.088 1.088 40 0.936 1.028 0.962
14 1.125 0.99 1.114 41 1 1.078 1.078
15 1.073 0.918 0.985 42 1 1.059 1.059
16 1 0.912 0.912 43 1.042 1.035 1.078
17 1 1.058 1.058 44 1.043 1.016 1.06
18 1.399 0.916 1.281 45 1.254 0.923 1.157
19 1 0.829 0.829 46 1.877 0.57 1.07
20 1 1.226 1.226 47 1 0.998 0.998
21 1 0.961 0.961 48 1.3 1.004 1.305
22 0.975 0.973 0.949 49 1 0.813 0.813
23 1.073 0.99 1.062 50 0.924 0.954 0.881
24 1 1.102 1.102 51 0.925 0.885 0.819
25 1 1.054 1.054 52 1.498 0.77 1.153
26
27
1
1.184
1
0.913
1
1.081
53 1 0.929 0.929
U n it  by u n it  re su lts  o f  the M a lm q u is t  ind e x: e ffic ie n c y  change, technical change and total factor
p ro d u c t iv ity  change.
T able A 4 .3 : M alm qu ist index resu lts  f o r  1993-1994 .
unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP
1 1 0.996 0.996 28 1 0.852 0.852
2 1 1.022 1.022 29 1 1.04 1.04
3 0.971 0.937 0.909 30 1 0.906 0.906
4 1 1.004 1.004 31 1 1.041 1.041
5 1 1.048 1.048 32 0.825 1.086 0.896
6 1 1.046 1.046 33 0.976 1.121 1.093
7 1 1.047 1.047 34 0.908 1.067 0.968
8 1 0.864 0.864 35 0.9 1.125 1.013
9 0.838 1.158 0.971 36 0.846 1.159 0.98
10 0.851 1.157 0.984 37 0.788 1.342 1.058
11 0.973 1.057 1.029 38 1 1.082 1.082
12 1 0.95 0.95 39 1 1.075 1.075
13 1 1.124 1.124 40 0.93 1.122 1.043
14 0.909 1.126 1.023 41 0.791 0.923 0.73
15 1.046 1.122 1.174 42 1 0.97 0.97
16 1 1.007 1.007 43 1 1.029 1.029
17 1 1.073 1.073 44 0.868 1.043 0.905
18 0.512 1.882 0.964 45 0.747 1.484 1.109
19 0.999 0.924 0.923 46 0.524 1.788 0.937
20 1 1.16 1.16 47 0.924 1.08 0.998
21 1 1.139 1.139 48 1 0.865 0.865
22 0.978 1.026 1.004 49 1 1.211 1.211
23 0.826 1.257 1.039 50 0.954 1.051 1.002
24 1 0.914 0.914 51 0.709 1.347 0.955
25 1 1.132 1.132 52 1.65 1.051 1.734
26
27
1
0.85
1.213
1.269
1.213
1.078
53 0.977 0.981 0.958
U n it  by u n it  re su lts  o f  the M a lm q u ist ind e x: e ffic ie nc y change, technical change and total facto r
p ro d u c tiv ity  change.
T able  A 4 .4 : M alm qu ist in d ex  resu lts f o r  1 9 9 4 -1 9 9 5 .
unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP
1 1 0.996 0.996 28 1 0.891 0.891
2 1 1.017 1.017 29 1 0.943 0.943
3 1.03 1.102 1.135 30 1 0.951 0.951
4 1 1.039 1.039 31 1 0.909 0.909
5 1 1.029 1.029 32 1.017 0.97 0.986
6 1 1.033 1.033 33 1.032 0.964 0.995
7 1 1.043 1.043 34 1.043 0.96 1.001
8 1 0.896 0.896 35 1.051 0.965 1.014
9 0.742 0.915 0.679 36 1.223 0.878 1.074
10 1.175 1.161 1.364 37 1.087 0.845 0.918
11 1.011 0.949 0.959 38 1 0.973 0.973
12 1 0.939 0.939 39 1 1.037 1.037
13 1 0.944 0.944 40 1.183 0.836 0.99
14 1.145 0.924 1.058 41 1.229 0.848 1.041
15 1 0.969 0.969 42 1 1.013 1.013
16 1 1.092 1.092 43 1 0.974 0.974
17 1 0.811 0.811 44 1.176 0.965 1.134
18 1.129 0.646 0.729 45 1.39 0.849 1.181
19 0.94 0.875 0.823 46 1.306 0.711 0.929
20 1 0.792 0.792 47 1.082 0.96 1.039
21 1 0.932 0.932 48 0.914 0.934 0.854
22 1.048 0.864 0.906 49 1 0.723 0.723
23 0.977 0.988 0.965 50 1.031 0.987 1.017
24 1 0.873 0.873 51 1.003 0.789 0.792
25 1 0.964 0.964 52 1.031 0.935 0.964
26
27
1
1.16
0.757
0.878
0.757
1.019
53 0.986 0.949 0.936
U n it  by u n it re su lts  o f  the M a lm q u is t  index: e ffic ie n c y  change, technical change and tota l factor
p ro d u c tiv ity  change.
Table A 4 .5 : M a lm q u is t index resu lts f o r  1995-1996.
unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP unit efficiency tech
(shirt)
TFP
1 0.944 1.074 1.014 28 1 1.503 1.503
2 1 1.101 1.101 29 1 0.987 0.987
3 0.84 1.067 0.897 30 1 1.066 1.066
4 0.995 0.995 0.99 31 0.952 0.852 0.811
5 1 0.992 0.992 32 1.058 1.022 1.081
6 0.974 0.995 0.969 33 0.974 1.064 1.037
7 1 1.261 1.261 34 0.924 1.04 0.961
8 1 1.146 1.146 35 0.962 0.989 0.952
9 1.33 0.836 1.112 36 0.856 1.051 0.9
10 0.892 0.899 0.802 37 1.167 1.096 1.28
II 0.988 0.968 0.957 38 1 0.967 0.967
12 1 0.955 0.955 39 0.981 1.007 0.988
13 1 0.98 0.98 40 1.112 0.964 1.072
14 0.848 1.026 0.871 41 1.029 1.051 1.082
15 0.903 1.003 0.905 42 1 0.79 0.79
16 1 0.954 0.954 43 1 1.024 1.024
17 1 1.062 1.062 44 1 1.101 1.101
IK 1.27 0.859 1.092 45 1.037 0.919 0.953
19 0.81 0.994 0.806 46 0.602 1.226 0.738
20 1 0.949 0.949 47 1 0.985 0.985
21 1 1.146 1.146 48 0.897 1.317 1.181
22 1 1.218 1.218 49 1 1.362 1.362
23 l.l 14 0.906 1.01 50 1.101 1.016 l.l 19
24 0.841 1.109 0.933 51 1.348 1.031 1.389
25 1 0.944 0.944 52 1 1.071 1.071
26
27
1
1.015
1.247 
0.981
1.247
0.996
53 1.038 1.039 1.078
U n it  by u n it re s u lt s  o f  the M a lm q u ist ind e x: e ffic ie nc y change, technical change and total factor
p ro d uctiv ity  change.
Table A 4 .6 : M a lm q u is t index  re su lts  f o r  1996-1997 .
unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP unit efficiency tech
(shift)
TFP
1 1.011 0.991 1.002 28 1 0.803 0.803
2 1 1.038 1.038 29 1 1.048 1.048
3 1.014 1.116 1.132 30 1 1.014 1.014
4 0.902 1.06 0.956 31 1.05 1.027 1.079
5 0.949 1.012 0.961 32 0.999 0.99 0.989
6 0.865 1.096 0.948 33 1.027 1.08 1.109
7 1 0.844 0.844 34 0.938 1.061 0.996
8 1 0.993 0.993 35 1.029 1.012 1.041
9 1.059 1.032 1.092 36 1.07 1.17 1.252
10 0.98 1.028 1.007 37 1 0.787 0.787
11 1.037 0.995 1.031 38 1 0.991 0.991
12 1 1.076 1.076 39 0.962 0.95 0.914
13 1 0.979 0.979 40 1.05 0.944 0.991
14 0.972 1.042 1.012 41 0.972 0.982 0.954
15 0.876 1.095 0.959 42 1 1.185 1.185
16 1 0.993 0.993 43 1 0.965 0.965
17 1 1.155 1.155 44 1 1.05 1.05
18 0.781 0.998 0.78 45 0.899 1.026 0.923
19 1.116 1.019 1.137 46 0.828 0.95 0.787
20 1 1.163 1.163 47 1 1.059 1.059
21 1 0.887 0.887 48 0.953 1.007 0.96
22 1 0.96 0.96 49 1 1.082 1.082
23 1.294 0.988 1.279 50 0.98 0.958 0.939
24 1.152 0.951 1.096 51 0.839 0.948 0.796
25 1 1.071 1.071 52 0.77 0.925 0.712
26
27
1
1.112
1.096
1.628
1.096
1.81
53 1 0.971 0.971
Unit by unit results of the Malmquist index: efficiency change, technical change and total factor 
productivity change.
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CHAPTER 5
THE STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS
The estimations in the previous chapter were carried out using the non- 
parametric, deterministic DEA. As will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 6 , 
this technique has a few characteristic drawbacks related to its non-stochastic 
nature:
a) Every distance from the frontier is attributed to inefficiency, as no noise is 
accounted for.
b) The estimation of the frontier itself is highly sensitive to the presence of 
outliers, which can therefore bias the results.
Furthermore, by definition the methodology just calculates distances from a 
frontier with no specification whatsoever of the underlying production function. 
If this is an advantage as no assumption has to be made a priori about the form of 
the function itself, on the other hand it limits the analysis of the characteristics 
and the performance of a sector (inputs and outputs elasticities etc.).
For all these reasons a complementary, stochastic frontier analysis is considered 
necessary, and this is the subject of this chapter.
As already observed, hospitals are multiple output production units. Whereas this 
did not create any problems in DEA, the estimation of a regular production 
frontier as specified and described in Chapter 3 is not possible. Three possible 
solutions to the problem were discussed then, i.e. the estimation of a cost frontier, 
the use of index numbers and the estimation of a distance function. The analysis 
of this chapter consists of the estimation of a stochastic output distance function,
using the model by Coelli and Perelman (1996); index numbers are also used, for 
reasons that will become apparent in section 5.2.
As regards the choice of a functional form for the deterministic part of the 
equation, the number of observations makes it possible to estimate a flexible 
function like the translog and eventually test for more restrictive specifications.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 discusses the distance function 
model. Section 5.2 contains a description of the data and the variables used. The 
criteria for the model choice are in Section 5.3 and the results and their 
discussion are in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 covers the issue of technological 
change and section 5.6 that of the relevance of trust status. The conclusions to the 
chapter are in Section 5.7.
5.1 The distance function.
In this section, the distance function model proposed by Coelli and Perelman 
(1996) is presented and then interpreted and discussed.
Let’s assume there are N firms that use a vector Jte R* of inputs to produce a 
vector y e  R+ of outputs, and recall from Chapter 3 the definition of an output 
distance function as a radial expansion measure for the output vector(s) y in order 
to reach the frontier, i.e.
(5.1)
1 2 2
This is homogeneous of degree -1 and weakly monotonically increasing in 
outputs, and invariant to changes in the units of measurement. The idea in Coelli 
and Perelman is that (5.1) can be mathematically expressed as a function of the K 
inputs and M outputs levels of each of the N firms as follows (assuming the log 
linear, translog function specification):
M J M M K
In D,„ = <*„ + £  a m In y mi + ”  X  Z I n  y m, In y m + £  Pk In xkl +
m —1 ^  m =1 n = \ k =1
j K K K M
+ -  E  E  Pu ln x ki ln ■*/, + X I  8 k m  ln x u In y mi (5.2)
2 k = \ l= \ k =I m =1
i = 1,........N
k  =  1,........ K
m = 1........  A/
Linear homogeneity in outputs of D„ implies that
D„(x,ioy) = coD„(x, >>) V(0 > O
Hence, one can chose any of the M outputs, say the M h one, and set co = 1/yM so 
that
D„(x,y/yM)=D„(x,y)/yM (5.3)
So linear homogeneity can be imposed on (5.2) that becomes
In( D ^
M  - I  1 M - 1 M - \  K
= «(, + X a m in y * mi + -  Z L ««iln in y *m + E P k ln **, +
m=l ^  m=l n  =I A:=1
+ i  Z Z&/ ln ** ln */, + I X  ln In y *„
^  k = \ /=l A = l m=l
(5 .4 )
/ = 1......N
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where v*m=V„/vM- When ym= yM the ratio is equal to one, therefore its log is 
equal to zero and all the terms involving the M-th output disappear from the 
equation.
For simplicity, let’s call TL(.) the whole translog function in (5.4); this can be
estimated by noting that
H D J y Mi) = TL(.)
is the same as
lnD,„-lnyM, = TL(.)
and therefore
-Inym = TL(.) -  lnDoi (5.5)
Adding a stochastic component V(~N(0,ct2v) and setting lnD0i = -U j, equation (5.5) 
becomes
lnyM, = -TL(.) +v, -u,
This can be now estimated as a usual production frontier, by regressing (the log 
of) one output on the (logs of) the inputs and the (logs of) the outputs ratio. Note 
that the coefficients of a production frontier correspond to the negative of the 
coefficients of a distance function: so for example a positive elasticity of output 
with respect to one input corresponds to an elasticity of the distance function with 
respect to that input which is negative and has the same absolute value. In the 
one-output case this is pretty intuitive, but the same is true in the multiple output 
case. Let’s specify (5.5) for the multiple output case:
M -1 |  M  -I M  -I K
In y  M i =  «0 +  E  a m  ■» T  * m i  +-X I  a m n  T *  m i >1 V *  n i  +  X A  ln  X  k , +
m=1 ^  nt=I /!=I *=1
1 K K K M~\
+ -X X A /ln Xu ln X,i + 1 1  skm In x ki In y * mi + v i - u ,  (5.6)
4 k = \  1=1 *=l m =I
i = 1,2,....N
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Equation (5.6) can be viewed as a production function in its own right, in which 
however the level of one output depends not only on the input levels, but also on 
the output ratios1. The estimated parameters can be interpreted as the parameters 
of a production function, or as the negative of the parameters of a distance 
function, exactly as before.
To sum up, in the presence of multiple outputs, a distance function can be 
estimated. Via the above reparameterisations this is equivalent to estimating a 
production frontier in which one of the outputs is expressed as a function not 
only of the inputs, but also of the outputs ratio.
■
' The possibility of simultaneous equation bias resulting from the inclusion of the outputs among 
Ihc regressors is ruled out by the fact the ra tio  is used, which can be assumed to be exogenous. 
For details sec Coelli and Pcrelman (1996), page 10.
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5.2 The data.
Even though the distance function allows one to overcome the problem of the 
multiple output, still the number of regressors would have been too high if the 
translog were estimated using all the 5 output vectors used in Chapter 4.
The number of outputs was therefore reduced from 5 to 2 by constructing two 
indexes: one for the inpatients and one for the outpatients, day patients and day 
cases. It was considered more reasonable to keep these two categories separated 
because they represent very different kinds of treatment, the former having 
patients spend several days in the hospital and the latter no more than one day, 
sometimes without even using a bed (and the staff associated to it). As a 
substitution between the two kinds of services could have taken place, two 
separate indexes were defined.
The construction of the output index that summarises various categories of 
treatment makes it necessary to choose some weights that fairly represent the 
differences among them. The average cost per case and the average length of stay 
are commonly used.
For these estimations it was decided to use the average cost per case (or category 
of treatment), on the assumption that more difficult illnesses are more input­
demanding than the less serious ones: some might require the use of particular 
equipment, and/or more medical staff time, as well as a longer time spent in the 
hospital, which in turn implies more inputs use, and therefore a higher cost.
1 2 6
However, in order not to bias the weights with some measure of inefficiency of 
each hospital, the average cost per case was calculated as the average cost for the 
whole of Scotland, and not the average cost per hospital. The index for every 
hospital was therefore constructed as:
j
y = 'L « ic j j= l>.....J
j-1
where q, is the number of cases treated in each category j ,  and cj is the average 
cost per case in Scotland. As the two main output categories were kept separated, 
two final output indexes were calculated as above, which are: 
yi = index of inpatients
y2  = index of outpatients, day patients and day cases.
The number and kind of inputs are the same as in DEA, so that in the end the
variables are
yi = index of inpatients
y2 = index of outpatients, day patients and day cases.
Xi = capital level (measured in £0 0 0 )
x2 = medical staff WTE (whole time equivalent)
X3 = nursing staff WTE 
X4  = other staff WTE 
X5 = number of beds
The data set is a (balanced) panel of 312 observations, with N= 52 and T=6 , that 
is 52 hospitals2 observed over a period of 6  years, from 1991-92 to 1996-97\
2 Actually, the number of cross sections was reduced from 53 to 52. As one of the observations 
had one of the variables equal to 0 at some point in time, and ln() docs not exist, it was preferred 
to delete that one observation rather than complicating the analysis by using some further 
transformation, like for example the Box Cox.
’ From now on, 1991/92 will be referred to as 1992, 1992/93 as 1993 and so on.
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5.3 The model.
The model to estimate is the translog output distance function
In y 2i, = a 0 + a ,  In
/  > ( „ VI
yut
+ « n ln
y\u
> _ 1
+  Z  A  ln  X k il +
*=i
5 5 5
+ X Z A / ln * u,ln xu, + E  A ln xki,ln
i=l/=l t =1
(5.7)
i  =  l , . . . . ,N  a n d  N  =  52  
t  -  a n d  T  =  6
over the whole data set4. This is equivalent to estimating a single frontier for all 
the 312 observations, each of which will have a calculated distance from it. A 
single frontier (with constant parameters across observations and over time) is 
quite restrictive as an assumption A time effect, represented either with some 
dummies or a time trend is therefore introduced in the above equation. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a time effect might be worth modelling also for the 
inefficiency component5. The specification adopted for the time varying 
inefficiency is the one proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992), which is 
automatically performed by the software FRONTIER 4.1:
tin = Ujexp[-r|(t-T)] (5.8)
As seen in more detail in Chapter 3, a value of T|>0 (T)<0) implies increasing 
(decreasing) efficiency over time. If r)=0 then there is no time effect, and the 
hypothesis can be tested by means of a LR test.
4 No dummy for trust status could be introduced for endogeneity reasons. The issue is discussed 
in detail in section 5.6.
5 It has to be mentioned at this point that several model specifications were attempted and 
compared before the final choice was made, including a random effects model and different ML 
estimations based on different inefficiency distributions hut with no time effects. They all 
presented different problems and were consequently discarded. The software FRONTIER 4 .1 was 
chosen as it allows for a time varying inefficiency, which is not possible with LIMDEP, although 
the latter can estimate quite a large set of panel data and frontier models. For a more detailed 
comparison o f LIMDEP and FRONTIER 4 .1 sec Sena (1999).
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The procedure followed to select a model was the following.
As before, a model like (5.6) assumes all parameters to be constant over time 
and across units, so in order to allow for a time effect one can assume either 
different intercepts for every year or include a time trend. The following models 
were estimated then: one with 5 dummy variables and an intercept (Ml), one 
with a quadratic time trend (t and t2) (M2), and one with a linear time trend (M3). 
These models were tested against each other and against a restricted model with 
no time effect whatsoever (M4). The test used is the Likelihood Ratio test (LR)h 
which is specified as 
LR = 2[ X(H,)-X(H0 )]~X2r
where X is the value of the maximised log-likelihood and r is the number of 
restrictions.
In these and all other tests in the chapter, the significance level is always 0.05
unless otherwise stated
The results are shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 6
Table 5.1: Estimation of models M l to M4: log likelihood and number of 
parameters.
Ml M2 M3 M4
X 178.91 167.81 155.47 151.79
n 33 30 29 28
X is the value o f the maximised log likelihood 
n is the number of parameters.
6 This is because all the tested model pairs arc nested in one another. The specification of the 
restrictions is offered in Appendix 5.1.
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Table 5 .2 : L R  te s ts  resu lts  (n u m ber o f  re s tr ic tio n s  in to  brackets).
Ml vs M4 M2 vs M4 M3 vs M4 M2 vs M3 Ml vs M2
LR 54.24 (5) 32.04 (2) 7.36(1) 24.68 (1) 22.2 (3)
implication Ho rejected Ho rejected Ho rejected Ho rejected Ho rejected
The 4 models have the following time specifications: Ml = dummy variables (five); M2 = 
quadratic time trend; M3 = linear time trend; M4 = no time effect.
The tests sequence is the following: first test whether there is a time effect or not: 
M4 (the null hypothesis) is tested against Ml (dummy variables), M2 (quadratic 
time trend), and M3 (linear time trend). In all cases the null hypothesis has to be 
rejected (see Table 5.2), meaning that a time effect exists. Then the three models 
including a time variable are tested against one another. A quadratic time trend is 
preferred to a linear one but not to the dummy variables specification, so finally 
this last one is chosen.
As the parameters’ estimates of M 1 showed that 2 out of the 5 time dummies are 
not significant (in particular, those for 1994 and 1995) and have very similar 
estimates, a different specification in which those two years are put together in a 
common dummy is attempted next. This therefore translates into a model with 4 
time dummy variables:
D, = I in 1993, 0 else
D2= I in 1994 and 1995,0 else
Di = 1 in 1996, 0 else
D4 = I in 1997, 0 else.
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Call this model M5, it has £  = 178.79 and n = 32; when compared to Ml by 
means of a LR test the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, so M5 is the final 
specification used7.
5.4 The results.
The preceding section showed that the model which best fits the data to measure 
hospitals’ inefficiency is a translog output distance function, in which the 
logarithm of one of the outputs (in this case y2, the index of outpatients, day 
patients and day cases) is regressed on the log of the outputs ratio y* = y//v’ 2 and 
on the five inputs, with the addition of 4 dummy variables to allow for a different 
intercept per year.
The equation therefore is
In y 2i, = a () + or. In y * +a t, (y * ) 2 + £  Pk In xu, +
k=\
5 5 5 4
+ Z Z A / ln x kit In*«, + X S k ln >’* + Z C A  +v„ -M„
k=t 1=1 * = l <=l
(5.9)
where
i = 1......N and N=52
t = l ......T and T=6
and
u,t = Uiexp[-tl(t-T)]
vn i.i.d.~N(0, a 2,.)
£n= Vh-Uh
7 The complete deletion of the two dummies from the equation was discarded on two grounds: the 
proneness of the translog to multicollinearity and the fact that even if not significant it is
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The (in)efficiency component m„ is a function of time as shown in (5.9). As 
regards the distribution of u, this was first modelled as a truncated normal with 
mean p different from 0 , i.e.
U i =  |t/ , | 
and
Ui~N(fi,ou2) (510)
which gave a log likelihood £=  178.79. Then it was modelled as a half normal 
distribution, i.e.
Ui  =  | t / ,  |
Ui~N(0,ou2) (5.11)
which gave a log-likelihood £  =178.63. As seen in Chapter 3 the half normal 
distribution is equivalent to the truncation at 0  of a normal distribution with a 0  
mean, so the two models can be compared by testing on (5.10) the null 
hypothesis Ho: p=0 against the alternative Hp 0. The LR test of 0.32 led to 
not reject Ho, and the half normal distribution was chosen, as in (5.11). The 
results are shown in Table 5.3.
interesting to check the sign of the coefficient when analysing technical change.
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T able 5 .3: R e su lts  o f  the e stim a tio n  o f  equ ation  (5 .9 ), t- ra tio s  in to  b rackets.
parameter coefficient parameter coefficient
Oto 2.83 (3.36) P 24 -0 . 1 2 (-1.30)
a. 0 . 1 1 (0.84) P i i -0.16 (-0.92)
a n -0.004 (-0.34) P 3 4 -0.54 (-2.14)
Pi 0.57 (2.85) Ps* -0.4 (-1.05)
P 2 -0.81 (-2.09) P45 0.48 (2.42)
P3 1.9 (2.35) 5, -0 . 1 2 (-3.10)
P 4 0.71 (2.04) 82 -0.003 (-0.07)
Ps - 1 . 6 6 (-2.48) 8 , 0 . 1 2 (1.38)
Pn -0.04 (-1.89) 8 4 0.024 (0.46)
P 22 -0 . 1 0 (-1.83) 8 , -0.14 (-1.84)
PJ3 0 . 2 1 (0.7) c. 0 . 1  1 (4.44)
P44 0.14 (1.78) 0.034 (116)
PS3 0.035 (0.23) -0.08 (-2.17)
P l2 0 . 1 0 (1.78) (¡4 -0 . 1 (-2.45)
P lJ -0.15 (-1.04)
2
O' 0.1 15 (4.53)
P l4 -0.17 (-1.98) Y 0.91 (39.2)
P is 0.28 (2 . 1 1 ) n 0.09 (4.95)
P23 0.5 (2 .2 2 ) i* 0
X 178.63
OLS X 23.34
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The influence of the inefficiency component is measured by the parameter y  = 
(T J t j  , where o2 = 0 2„+ cr2,. is the variance of the composite error term £,, = v,, - u„ 
The significance of /can  be tested with an LR test which, if the null hypothesis 
Ho: Y= 0 is true, follows a mixed distribution8. If the null hypothesis is true 
and inefficiency is not significant, the model is equivalent to a standard "average" 
production frontier, and its log-likelihood is the same as that of OLS (reported in 
Table 5.3). The LR test value is 310.58, so the null hypothesis is strongly rejected 
by the data, meaning that inefficiency is significant.
The significance of r\, i.e. of the time effect on (in)efficiency, is similarly tested 
by means of an LR test. The log-likelihood under the null hypothesis H0: r\ = 0 is 
165.04, giving an LR score of 27.2 which again is rejected by the data. Moreover 
77 is positive meaning that inefficiency tends to decrease over time. As 
01n(uit)/ dt = -T|
the estimated value of 0.09 corresponds to an annual rate of change of Ujt of 9%. 
In terms of the distance D,,it =exp(-uit), the average scores for each year are 
reported in Table 5.4. This shows that the average efficiency increases 
approximately by a 2.5% every year’.
Table 5.4: Average distance values from the estimation o f (5.9).
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
D„ (average) 0.695 0.714 0.732 0.750 0.767 0.783
Do is the average value of the output distance function, with 0<Do<l: a value of I 
(<1) indicates efficiency (inefficiency).
As regards the significance of the coefficients, the translog function is usually 
prone to a high level of multicollinearity because of the presence of the squared
K See details in Chapter 3.
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and interaction terms. This is very often the reason why many of the parameters 
of translog functions turn out non-significant to the usual t-test even if they are 
non zero. As a consequence it is preferable not to look at the single t-ratios but to 
carry out different testing procedures that involve more than one parameter at the 
same time.
The next step is therefore to calculate the partial and total elasticities and to 
check for their significance. The partial elasticity with respect to the k-th input 
will be given by
ek = ^ l2 - = /3k +2/3kklnxk + ^ / 3 kllnxl +Sk \ny*  l * k  (5.12)
a In xk m
and the total elasticity is the sum of the partial elasticities.
It is clear from (5.12) that elasticity depends on the inputs and outputs levels, so 
in order to calculate a general measure for the whole sample all elasticities are 
calculated at the variables’ sample mean.
Six partial elasticities are calculated (five for the inputs and one for the outputs 
ratio), and a total input elasticity. The results are shown in Table 5.5. The 
elasticities are calculated over the whole time period as well as for every year 
separately (in this case using each year’s sample means).
Testing for the significance of (5.12) amounts to testing that the whole equation 
sums to 0. This can be computationally very demanding, but a condition that 
surely implies this result, and which can be tested, is that all its (seven) 1
1 The rate of change of D() is d(lnD())/dt, and it can he approximated hy the difference in the logs 
when dt=l.
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parameters are 0. The results of the LR test are reported in Table 5.6, one for 
every partial elasticity10 1.
Table 5.5: Partial and total elasticities, given the output ratio.
c^ap m^ed n^ur o^th Cbed t^ot ey
1992 -0.03 0.47 0.47 0.12 0.11 1.11 -0.74
1993 -0.08 0.46 0.54 0.12 0.05 1.09 -0.75
1994 -0.03 0.48 0.45 0.08 0.17 1.15 -0.75
1995 -0.06 0.46 0.45 0.07 0.21 1.14 -0.74
1996 -0.03 0.44 0.44 0.09 0.23 1.16 -0.73
1997 -0.04 0.45 0.48 0.05 0.21 1.15 -0.72
1992-97 -0.04 0.46 0.47 0.09 0.17 1.14 -0.74
Table 5.6: LR test for the significance of the partial elasticities.
c^ap Cmed ®nur o^th ^btd 2 ËI_______
LR test 26.68 92.00 26.74 37.26 26.80 4 10.26
implication H0
rejected
Ho
rejected
Ho
rejected
Ho
rejected
H„
rejected
Ho
rejected
In Table 5.5, the first 5 columns are the partial elasticities of every input, 
followed by the total input elasticity and then by the elasticity of with respect 
to the output ratio y* =y//>>2 - With the exception of capital, all inputs elasticities 
are positive, they are all significant and they sum to a total elasticity value of 1.14 
(equivalent to mild increasing returns to scale" at the sample means), whereas
10 Another possibility to get round the problem would be to re-estimate the equation normalising 
the data with their geometric mean. No further detail is provided here because the data set was too 
big to perform the necessary normalisation procedure.
11 The constant returns to scale hypothesis is tested by means of an LR test and rejected by the 
data, as the restricted model has a log likelihood o f-13.13.
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the elasticity with respect to the outputs ratio, ey is negative, significant and equal 
to -0.74. Given the particular functional specification used, e,(„ measures the 
effect that an increase in inputs has on the output, given the output ratio: if the 
output ratio remains the same then a 1 % increase in all inputs leads to an increase 
of 1.14% in both outputs. The effect that an increase in inputs has on the 
production of y2  alone, i.e. if the outputs ratio is not kept constant, can be 
calculated as follows.
Assume for ease of explanation that the estimated function has one input and two 
outputs (whose ratio is again y*) and looks like
In y 2 = a l \nx + In y *+/?,, (In y* ) 2 + yin xln y * (5.13)
The equivalent to ey is
d 'n = yg, + 2/?, | In y * +yln  x (5.14)
5 In y *
As y* is the outputs ratio one can rewrite and then differentiate (5.13) as
In y 2 =ar. In x+ >3, (In y, -  In y2) + /?,, (In y, -  In y 2 ) 2 + ylnx(ln y, -  In y2) 
d In y 2 =(a,  + y In y*)d In * + (/?, +2/3n In y *+y In x)d In y, -(/?, +2 J3„ In y *+yln jt)3 In y 2
or for ease of interpretation
d In y 2 = Ad  In x+  Bdln  y, -  Bd In y 2 
where
A =
d In y 2  
d In x
and B
d In y 2 
d In y *
so B is the same as (5.14). From (5.14) it is obvious that B has to be <0. 
Furthermore, as
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A >0 (5.15)d In y 2 
d In x 
and 
d In y 2 
d In y,
(1 + B)
- ? - < o
(1+ B)
(5.16)
it follows that -1<B<0; i.e., one has to expect the elasticity of y2 with respect to 
the ratio to be negative and in absolute value smaller than 1. The elasticity 
measure as in (5.16) now represents the relative change in y2 brought about by a 
change in yi, i.e. it is a measure of the substitutability between the two outputs. 
When B tends to 0 the elasticity will tend to 0, and when B tends to -1 the 
elasticity will tend to -°o, so that lower absolute values of B imply very little
substitutability between the two outputs, and higher absolute values of B a higher 
substitutability.
The new elasticities as in (5.15) and (5.16) are calculated (again at the variables’ 
sample mean) and the values are reported in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Partial and total elasticities, output ratio not fixed.
®caD ^ med e nur ®oth ®bed Çy Clot
Elasticity -0 .15 1.77 1.81 0 .35 0 .6 5 -2 .85 4 .4
Similarly to Table 5.5, Table 5.7 shows that the most productive inputs are the 
medical and the nursing staff, with elasticities bigger than I, whereas capital and 
other staff are least productive with the former showing negative returns. This 
makes the result difficult to interpret, as it would indicate that capital is always
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negatively contributing to production, even before hospitals turned into trusts and 
eventually started to overcapitalise.
As a consequence it is worth analysing whether this negative value holds true for 
all the observations in the sample, or if there might have been a change in the 
technology used by the hospitals during the whole time span, as suggested also in 
Chapter 4. In other words, because the estimated frontier comes from the pooling 
of all the observations together, it might be interesting to see whether this is 
actually correct, or if instead one can detect a change in the production process 
along time or between particular hospitals categories. This will be done in 
Section 5.5.
The output substitutability is -2.85, which means that a 1% increase in yi (the 
inpatients) leads to a more than proportional decrease (-2.85%) in yi (the 
outpatients, day patients and day cases). As one might expect inpatients turn out 
to be more expensive, in terms of resource use, than the outpatients. An inpatient 
is someone whose treatment requires to spend more than one day in the hospital, 
which implies the use of more resources as such (bedding and nursing staff) and 
because of the longer length of stay (one inpatient case lasts for longer than an 
outpatient case). As the output indexes have been constructed so as to reflect the 
different resource use in the two cases, the result is even less surprising.
As regards the 4 time dummies they indicate whether a different intercept 
characterises every year (or year pair), for technological change or other reasons. 
The intercepts a, are calculated as ti,= (£,+ot<>), so that a positive dummy 
parameter means a higher intercept, and viceversa. From Table 5.3, the dummies
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are significant with the exception of the one for 1994+1995, and they disclose a 
pattern around the average (the intercept value) as shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Pattern o f the four time dummies estimated in (5.9).
The figure shows that, starting from 1992, there is an increase in 1993 whereas 
from 1994-95 the trend is decreasing. If the dummies account for technological 
change then the above results would mean that there is a slowdown in 
productivity over time, especially after the main change to trust status has taken 
place. This is not what one would expect, and the very opposite of what seen in 
Chapter 4, so a different possibility is tested for: the possibility that not only the 
intercepts, but the very parameters of the equation might have changed over time. 
This possibility is explored in the next section.
5.5 Testing for technological change.
The estimations carried out in the previous sections pool all the data together and 
calculate a single frontier which is common to all observations at all points in 
time. This might be too restrictive a hypothesis, and one might want to test
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whether the data can be pooled together in the first place. One possibility of 
doing this would be to run a series of Chow tests for parameters stability, but this 
is ruled out for lack of degrees of freedom (the translog has too many parameters 
to be estimated on a single cross section of 52 observations). An alternative but 
still valid approach is used instead. This consists of estimating several times the 
distance function with a time interaction dummy instead of the intercept 
dummies. In particular, a time dummy d  is introduced, which takes a value of 1 
for a particular year(s), and 0  else, and this is multiplied to all the variables in the 
translog distance function, i.e.
lny2u = Ob+ p ’lnxa +d + p'lnx,4 +£,, (5.17)
where the x,,s are the explanatory variables of (5.9), d is the time interaction 
dummy and (3 and p  are vectors of parameters to estimate. This means that the 
parameters of the function will be P+p when d=  1, and (3 when d  = 0 .
The dummy is first set equal to 1 for 1992 (and 0 else), then for 1992 and 1993 
(and 0 else) and so on. In this way 5 different distance functions are estimated, 
each with a different time effect which is captured by the parameters of the 
interaction dummy. The comparison should shed some light on whether and how 
things have changed over time. The likelihood results of the five estimations of 
(5.17) are reported in Table 5.8.
Table 5.H: Log-likelihood of the translog distance function with time interaction 
dummy.
92 92 to 93 92 to 94 92 to 95 92 to 96
X 177.12 221.84 186.41 184.18 168.16
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The significance of the time interaction parameters is tested for by means of LR 
tests against a restricted model with no time effects and as expected12 the null 
hypothesis is always rejected. What is interesting here is to look at how the 
likelihood of the different specifications changes.
As can be seen in Table 5.8, a much higher value is obtained when separating 
1992 and 1993 from all other years. The latter are not very different from one 
another nor with respect to the value obtained with the varying intercepts model. 
This points to the fact that the parameters of the distance (and production) 
function might have changed after 1993.
Before proceeding, the following has to be stressed. A comparison between the 
above specification and the varying intercepts model can be done using the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) for non-nested models. Recall from Chapter 3 
that
AIC = -2 £  + 2n
where n is the number of parameters. When comparing models, the preferred one 
should be that with the lowest AIC value. Even though on the grounds of the 
Akaike information criterion the time interaction dummy model should be 
preferred to the varying intercepts one13, still it has 56 parameters in it, which is a 
very high number compared to the 312 observations. This makes the reliability of 
the choice more fragile; for this reason the results from the pooled, more 
parsimonious model can still be relied upon for the general analysis, although it 
is interesting and important to analyse the characteristics of this change in 
technology.
12 This is in tael consistent with the results obtained in Section 5.3, when comparing different 
model specifications.
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Given the above, the model in which 1992 and 1993 are separated from the 
following years is analysed hereinafter. All the results are reported in Appendix 
5.2, for reasons of space.
The parameter y, which measures the relevance of the inefficiency component, is 
significant (LR test is 343.08). As regards the effect of time on inefficiency, the 
value of r)=0.03 indicates a (significant) 13 4  15 improvement, though less marked than 
in the pooled model. The average increase in efficiency, as measured by the 
average value of the distance function, in this case is around 0 .8 % per year, 
whereas in the pooled model it was 2.5%. Further investigation shows that if the 
two sub-panels are estimated separately efficiency decreases between 1992 and 
1993, whereas it increases between 1994 and 1997. Even though the estimation 
of 29 parameters on a panel of 52 observations over two years only has not many 
degrees of freedom, the information is still interesting, raising the question of the 
relevance of trust status which will be dealt with in the next section.
The estimates from (5.17) are then used to calculate the different elasticities, 
which are reported in Table 5.9. As seen for equation (5.12), the values are 
calculated at the variables’ sample averages (before and after 1994 in this case) 
and they are all significant1'.
13 The time interaction model with a dummy for 1992 and 1993 has an Akaikc value of -331.68 
and the intercepts model a value o f-293.26.
14 LR test is 5.47.
15 See Appendix 5.2, Table A5.2.
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Table 5.9: Partial and total elasticities, estimation of (5.17).
®cap Cmed ^nur ®oth Cbcd ey Clot ev.
1992-1993 0.01 0 .3 2 0 .37 0 .2 3 0 .0 9 -0 .44 1.02 -0 .79
1994-1997 -0 .02 0 .2 4 0 .33 0 .0 8 .089 -0 .67 1.52 -2 .03
Like in Tables 5.4 and 5.5, ey is the elasticity of output yj (the outpatients, day 
patients and day cases index) with respect to the outputs ratio y*, i.e. keeping the 
latter fixed. ey* is the elasticity of output when the output ratio is not constant. e,„, 
is the total inputs elasticity, that is a measure of returns to scale (calculated at the 
sample mean).
Looking at Table 5.9, all inputs elasticities decrease with the exception of the 
beds variable. The inputs of capital, other staff and beds show the biggest 
changes in between the two periods. This is consistent with the results of Chapter 
4, and leads to a similar interpretation.
The productivity of capital turns negative, which is a signal of overcapitalisation. 
This however might also be a consequence of the fact that the acquisition of trust 
status (which starts in 1994 and covers the whole sample in 1996) involved an 
increase in the recorded level of capital for accountancy reasons, and it involved 
investment in information technology for the new contracting issues. As a 
consequence, concluding for a definite problem of overcapitalisation would be 
misleading.
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The elasticity of “other staff' reduces from 0.23 to 0.08. This reduction can be 
probably explained by the need to hire administrative staff to deal with the new 
contracting issues, and/or with the possible use of less qualified personnel for 
more qualified tasks.
The beds input instead shows a much higher elasticity, which is also the only 
reason why the elasticity of scale increases. The change in this partial elasticity 
can be the result of the reduction in the levels of this input16. That is, hospitals 
reduced the number of beds probably far too much even when considering the 
switch towards treating more outpatients and day patients as opposed to 
inpatients (the latter require a bed more strictly than the former, but the former 
still do).
As regards the elasticity of substitution between the two outputs (<?,,*) its absolute 
value increases from 0.79 (close to 1, perfect substitutability) to 2.03. After 1994, 
if resources are diverted from the treatment of outpatients to that of inpatients the 
former decrease much more than they used to, with a 1 % increase leading to 
more than a 2% decrease. This is possibly a consequence of the change in 
treatment patterns that took place over time. Hospitals started reducing the 
number of beds and increased the proportion of outpatients to inpatients. If in 
1992 it was more likely to be required to spend several days in a hospital to 
undergo some treatment, in more recent years this would happen only for fewer, 
very serious conditions, which also means more expensive to treat in terms of 
resource use and in turn explains the massive increase in the elasticity value.
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Before concluding this section, an attempt at measuring the change in 
productivity over time in made. A specific measure as the Malmquist index 
cannot be use here, but an approximate measure can be given by the changes in 
the average expected value of the output in each year. The average expected 
value of lny2 (the dependent variable) is calculated using the estimates of (5.17) 
and the variables’ sample means for each year. The results are reported in Table 
5.10 and show an average increase in productivity of around 9% a year. It has to 
be kept in mind however that this is an increase in the production of y2, and the 
substitution of yi with y2 here is more relevant than ever, as the decrease in the 
output ratio among the regressors surely affects the result. 16
Table 5.10: Average expected level o f output.
Average expected output
(lny2)
1992 8.04
1993 8 . 2 1
1994 8.38
1995 8.53
1996 8.55
1997 8.48
average rate of change 8 .8 %
The rate of change is calculated as the difference in the logs.
16 Cfr Chapter 4, Table 4.2.
1 4 6
What general picture is therefore revealed? After 1994 hospitals start using their 
resources differently, and their productivity increases, that is the frontier shifts 
outwards. Both the inputs levels and the way in which these inputs are used (the 
parameters of the function) do change, and the change is mainly reflected in the 
fact that they treat patients preferably on a daily basis rather than having them 
spending more than one day in the hospital: the number of outpatients, day 
patients and day cases (>’2 ) in fact increases steadily, whereas some of the 
categories of the inpatients experience even a negative growth17.
This strong substitution between the two outputs translates into the high 
measured annual increase in productivity (shift of the efficient frontier of 8 .8 %) 
as this is calculated as the expected value of (the log of) y2 only. Furthermore, it 
is also probably the reason why the number of beds is reduced, although the 
much higher elasticity of the input suggests that the reduction might not be 
optimal (i.e. the input is still very productive and if increased could contribute to 
the treatment of many more people). All other inputs have lower elasticity values 
suggesting that they are used more efficiently.
Finally, efficiency in terms of distance from the frontier also increases: the 
parameter 77 (representing the rate of change of the inefficiency component in the 
error term) is positive and significant, translating into an average efficiency 
improvement of around 0.8% a year. This value is lower than the 2.5% obtained 
with the varying-intercepts model, because this did not take technological change 
properly into account. More specifically, the intuition is this. The varying- 
intercepts model assumes a common technology, in terms of slope, for all the
17 Cfr Chapter 4, Table 4.1.
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years, “averaging” the characteristics of the technologies used before and after 
1994. In this way the units of the first two years are being compared against a 
frontier that might be emphasising the production of y2 more than it should, and 
viceversa for the units after 1994.
This can translate into a larger distance from the frontier in the first two years and 
a larger improvement in efficiency over time than if the difference in technology 
is taken into account. The results seem to confirm this intuition: the average 
distance from the frontier in 1992 is 0.695 in the common technology model, and 
0.717 in the other one. In 1997 the order is reversed, with the common 
technology giving an average distance of 0.783 and the other a value of 0.746.
On the other hand, as already stressed, this limitation of the varying-intercepts 
model is counterbalanced by the fact that it is much more parsimonious, so that 
its results can be relied upon for general inference.
5.6 The relevance of trust status
The previous analysis showed a general increase in efficiency and productivity, 
as well as a change in technology which is very likely related to the change in 
status. What is interesting to do now is to check whether hospital trusts, so the
very working of the reform, are more efficient than non-trusts. That is, whether
trust status is a significant variable in explaining efficiency.
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No trust dummy was included in the models because of a possible problem of 
endogeneity. This would be true if hospitals decided to change status because 
they were more efficient rather than the other way round. However, the 
possibility was tried, the dummy was non-significant and all the other parameters 
estimates remained basically the same. Given the endogeneity concern, a 
different kind of analysis is done.
As was seen in Chapter 3, one could perform a two-stage analysis, where the 
estimated inefficiencies are regressed on a set of explanatory variables. This 
however gives less efficient estimates than estimating the parameters of the 
frontier and those of the inefficiency term at the same time. One model of this 
kind (Battese and Coelli, 1995) can be estimated using FRONTIER 4.1. This 
consists of modelling the inefficiency component h„ as a truncated normal 
variable coming from a distribution whose mean is in turn a function of a set of 
explanatory variables, i.e.
«„=1 U„ I
Un~ N(mihc?) 
and
m,, =<p'zn
where z„ is a vector of explanatory variables and (p a vector of parameters to 
estimate.
For the present case, only one explanatory variable is used in z„, that is a 0-1 
dummy for trust status.
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This model is first estimated on the whole panel but it fails to converge to a 
maximum; therefore, two sub-panels, one for the years 1992-1993 and one for 
1994-1997, are specified next.
Again, the 1992-1993 panel does not converge to a maximum, probably because 
of a too low number of hospital trusts then (3 out of 104 observations). The 
estimation for 1994-1997 does instead work and gives a value of ¿C=76.29; the 
trust dummy’s parameter is estimated as negative but non-significant (t ratio = - 
1.44).
To double-check on the result a second stage regression can be tried, in which the 
estimated inefficiencies from (5.17) are regressed on a trust dummy. Even if less 
efficient than the simultaneous estimation carried out above, it has the advantage 
of including all the years.
One concern could be that by the way inefficiency was modelled, the ranking of 
the units is the same every year because it is based on the value of u,, at time T. 
However this calculation is made using the information of the whole panel data 
set, that is considering the behaviour of units through time18. It is therefore still 
informative to carry out the estimations.
The model consists of regressing the whole vector of 312 inefficiencies on 
separate trust dummies, as shown in (5.18) below. In this way one can test two 
things: whether trust status is in general a relevant factor in explaining 
(in)efficiency (through the joined significance of the parameters); and whether
'* In other words this means that the inefficiency scores and the ranking of the panel data set arc 
not the same of those of a frontier that uses only data at time T.
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the trusts of a particular year are significantly different from other hospitals 
(through the single parameter’s significance).
The model is specified as
A
Ui = a 0 + btt, + b2t2 + b2t2 + £, (5.18)
where
ti= 1 if trust in 1993, 0 else 
t2  = 1 if trust in 1994, 0 else 
t.i = 1 if trust in 1995, 0 else
Only years 1993, 1994 and 1995 are in the equation, because in 1992 no hospitals 
are trusts, therefore making a vector of Os, and in 1996 and 1997 all of them are, 
thus giving vectors of Is, and the matrix would be singular.
The results of the estimation of equation (5.18) are reported in Table 5.11. The 
very low R2  ( 0.003) is explained by the fact that none of the dummies’ 
parameters is significant, neither jointly nor separately.
Table 5.11: Results of the estimation o f (5.18).
parameter estimate t-ratio F test
do 2 . 1 0 2 95.87
b, 0 . 0 2 0 . 1 1
t>2 0.09 1.03 0.356
b, 0.004 0.07
R2 0.003
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The results are therefore confirmed: trust status is not significant in explaining 
efficiency scores, neither is there any evidence that the first trusts were more 
efficient than other hospitals.
5.7 Conclusions.
In this chapter, a stochastic output distance function has been estimated in 
different ways, to measure and analyse the changes in efficiency and productivity 
of 52 acute hospitals in Scotland in the period between 1991/92 and 1996/97.
First, a general pooled model shows all hospitals improving their efficiency over 
time at a rate of 2.5% a year. One frontier only is calculated for all the hospitals, 
with fixed parameters though varying intercepts to allow for technological 
change. The unexpected negative pattern of change revealed by the intercept 
dummies raised the possibility that the slope parameters of the equation, and not 
just the intercepts might have changed over time.
A different model specification is therefore estimated, with a time interaction- 
dummy which allows for the change in parameters. In this way a structural break 
is detected that separates the technologies used before and after 1994, which is 
also when hospitals start changing status. The new technology shows very 
different inputs elasticities from the older one and is more directed towards the 
treatment of patients on a day basis, which translates into a higher opportunity 
cost of treating an inpatient. Efficiency increases over time, now by a 0.8% a 
year, and productivity, measured as the average expected value of the dependent
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variable, increases quite significantly (8 .8 % a year). This last measure could be 
used as an approximation of the shift of the frontier over time, but by 
construction it will emphasise only one the two output vectors.
The switch to a different technology and the change of status almost coincide, as 
the first big trust wave takes place in 1994, but trust status is not revealed as 
relevant in determining efficiency.
It is plausible to conclude that over time performance has improved, both in 
terms of shifts of the frontier itself and of distances from it, and hospitals have 
changed the technology used for the provision of their services as well as the kind 
of services provided, but that this improvement is specific to hospital trusts is not 
proved. Without data covering the period before the introduction of the reform, it 
cannot be excluded that such improvements could be a general pattern of change 
over time.
How these results compare with those obtained in Chapter 4, and what the 
general picture shows, are the subject of the next chapter.
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APPENDIX 5.1
Selection of models M1 to M4 estimated in Section 5.3.
The comparison of models in Section 5.3 was made by means of LR tests 
because in each case one model was nested in the other. The restrictions imposed 
in each case are specified hereinafter.
For all the models:
N=52
T= 6
NxT=312
f(.) is the translog distance function, with n = 27 parameters
Model 1: 5 intercept dummy variables
Ml = do + f(.) + 8 i D i +8 2 0 2 +8 3 0 1 +8 4 0 4 +8 5 0 5 + £ ¡1
where
Di=l for time 2 and 0 else 
D2=l for time 3 and 0 else 
D?= 1 for time 4 and 0 else 
D4=l for time 5 and 0  else 
D,= l for time 6  and 0 else
Model 2: quadratic time tend
M2 = Po + f(.) + Pit +p2 t~ + £ii 
Model 3: linear time trend
M3 = Yo+ f(.) + pit+ £i.
Model 4: no time effect
M4 = <p(,+ f(.) + £„
The restriction(s) imposed in the tests were the following:
1) Ml vs M4
M4 is nested in M 1 if 
81=82=8^84=81=0 
number of restrictions^
2) M2 vs M4
M4 is nested in M2 if
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Pl=p2=0
number of restrictions^
3) M3 vs M4
M4 is nested in M3 if 
Pi=0
number of restrictions: 1
4) M2 vs M3
M3 is nested in M2 if
p2=o
number of restrictions: 1
5) Ml vs M2
M2 is nested in Ml if
83 = 82 -81
84 = 202-3 8 ,
85 =  38 2-48 ,
number of restrictions: 3
This comes from observing that M 1 could be reparameterised as
CKo= Po+ Pi +P2 
§1= Pi + 3 p2 
82= 2P, + 8P2 
83= 3 p, + 15P2 
84= 4 P, + 2 4 p2 
8-,= 5 p, + 3 5 P2
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APPENDIX 5.2
Results from the estimation of equation (5.17)
Table A5.I: 
brackets.
Parameters ' estimates o f equation (5.17). Standard errors into
parameter coefficient parameter coefficient
oto 3.81 (4.25) Pit 0.09 (0.53)
ai 0.64 (3.39) P14 -0.23 (-2.51)
an -0.06 (-2.61) Pis 0.22 (1.37)
Pi 0.37 (1.66) ß23 0.36 (145)
P2 -0.21 (-0.47) P24 -0.01 (-0.07)
P3 1.01 (U 4 ) p25 -0.24 (-1.22)
P4 0.83 (2.26) P14 -0.51 (-1.80)
Pi -1.55 (-2.25) P.35 -0.09 (-0.25)
P.l -0.07 (-2.48) P45 0.38 (1.66)
P22 -0.07 (-1.14) 8, -0.10 (-2.17)
Ptt 0.04 (0.12) 82 0.01 (0.08)
P44 0.14 (1.91) 8 , -0.03 (-0.22)
PtS 0.002 (0.01) 8 4 0.14 (2.03)
P.2 0.05 (0.86) 8 , -0.18 (-1.73)
This part of the table shows the value of the parameters when the dummy is equal 
toO.
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parameter coefficient parameter coefficient
Pi 0 .0 3 (0 .2 1 ) Pis 0 .1 6 (1 .1 9 )
P2 -5 .58 (-3 .8 5 ) P16 -0 .44 (-1 .63 )
P i -0 .5 7 (-2 .1 7 ) Pl7 0 .0 7 (0 .43 )
p4 -0.01 (-0 .1 7 ) P18 0 .0 4 (0 .1 9 )
Ps 0 .7 (1.21) Pl9 0 .3 0 (0 .99 )
P6 -3 .0 2 (-4 .4 7 ) p20 0.31 (1 .44 )
P7 -0 .9 7 (-0 .8 1 ) P2I 0.11 (0 .47 )
Ps 2 .9 9 (3 .4 3 ) p22 -1 .0 0 ( - 1 9 1 )
P9 1.50 (1 .6 1 ) p23 -2 .75 (-0 .4 0 )
PlO 0 .0 3 (0 .6 6 ) P24 0 .3 6 (0 .8 8 )
Pll -0 .2 6 (-2 .9 6 ) P25 0.11 ( 1 2 7 )
Pl2 0 .8 0 (1 .4 7 ) p26 0.001 (0 .0 2 )
Pit -0 .0 4 (-0 .2 4 ) P27 0 .2 0 (1 .22 )
P14 -0 .2 4 (-0 .8 9 ) P28 -0 .22 (-1 .9 0 )
£ 221.84 o2 0.18 (4 .8 )
OLS £ 50.30 Y 0.96 (8 7 .7 4 )
0 0.03 (2 .2 1 )
This part of the table shows the parameters of the interaction dummy. The order 
of the parameters is the same as in the first part of the table.
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Table A5.2: LR tests results on the significance o f the elasticities from the 
estimation of equation (5.17). Number o f restrictions into brackets.
®cap
LR test
Cmed
LR test
®nur
LR test
^oth
LR test
®bed
LR test
e y
LR test
1992-1993 2 0 .1 2 47.1 3 1 .6 25 .8 8 4 8 .8 4 4 6 6 .0 6
(7)
1994-1997 2 6 .8 4 106.4 4 7 .6 6 7 7 .4 4 6 2 .8 8 4 9 8 .8 8
(14)
The null hypothesis is rejected in all cases, so all elasticities are significant at the 5% level.
Table A5.3: Average distance values from the estimation o f (5.17).
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
D„ (average) 0 .7 1 7 0 .7 2 3 0 .7 2 9 0 .7 3 5 0.741 0 .7 4 6
Do is the average value of the output distance function, with 0<Do<l: a value of 
1 (<1) indicates efficiency (inefficiency).
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CHAPTER 6
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter is to finally put together all the results of the thesis and draw 
some general conclusions. The comparison of the techniques used for the empirical 
analysis and their results is the subject of Section 6.1, and the general conclusions of the 
whole work are in Section 6.2.
6.1 Conclusions from the empirical analysis.
In order to compare the results obtained in Chapters 4 and 5 it is useful to briefly explain 
what are the differences in the two techniques used (DEA and the econometric stochastic 
frontier) and the reasons why they were used both1.
DEA is a non-parametric, deterministic approach that by linear programming constructs a 
piecewise linear frontier using the information contained in the data. The actual levels of 
inputs and outputs are observed unit by unit; to measure efficiency, every unit is 
“compared” with, or contracted against, the closest supporting hyperplane, i.e. with the 
units that have the most similar technique, in terms of inputs to outputs ratios.
The non-parametric nature means that no assumption is made about the existence of a 
production function common to the observations, which eliminates the risk of
1 See for example Cubbin and T/.anidakis (1998), and Drake and Weyman Jones (1996).
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misspecification of the production technology. Units can be very different in the way they 
produce their output, and in this case each unit will always be compared with the ones 
most similar to it. This comparison translates into specific targets of inputs reduction or 
outputs increase for every (inefficient) observation. This detail on the single units of the 
sample makes the methodology better suited when this is the focus of the analysis. An 
additional advantage of the non-parametric nature is that DEA can readily handle 
multiple inputs and multiple outputs, and is fairly easy to estimate.
DEA is deterministic because no allowance is made for any statistical noise. The lack of 
distributional assumptions, which is a sense could be an advantage, is the major 
limitation of the method. First, the frontier is constructed on the basis of the actual 
observations, which makes it extremely sensitive to outliers. Furthermore, the lack of 
statistical noise means that every distance from this frontier is attributed to inefficiency, 
whereas it could be due to other factors (measurement errors, factors beyond the control 
of the firm etc.). This in turn can lead to an inaccurate measurement of inefficiency, both 
overestimating the efficiency of some exceptional units and/or underestimating the 
efficiency of others.
The second problem is that the lack of distributional assumptions eliminates the 
possibility of proper statistical testing of hypotheses. Non parametric tests can be used, 
which are however weaker than the parametric ones. One of the consequences of it is that 
the choice of the variables becomes crucial: the decision has to be made beforehand not 
only of what factors are expected to be relevant but also in which way they are expected
1 60
to be so. Different variables can lead to very different results, but a choice cannot be 
made on proper statistical grounds, making the approach less reliable.
The econometric stochastic frontier is almost the very opposite to the above, as it is 
parametric and stochastic. Inefficiency is modelled as an asymmetrically distributed 
component of the error term. The stochastic nature makes the results more reliable, in 
themselves and because the models can undergo proper statistical tests.
As a parametric approach, assumptions have to be made about the behaviour and 
objectives of the units in the sample. However, the specific problem of having to choose 
a functional form can be reduced by the possibility of testing different models, and with 
large enough data sets flexible functional forms can be used to minimise the number of 
restrictions.
Other assumptions are necessary, on the distribution of both the stochastic and the 
inefficiency component of the error term, and this can affect the results as discussed in 
Chapter 3. Finally, multiple inputs and multiple outputs are not as easy to manage as they 
are in the non-parametric approach.
It appears from the above that the characteristics, and so the strengths and weaknesses of 
the two methods, are quite complementary. By not imposing any functional restriction 
DEA can give quite detailed information about the units in the sample; when used to
calculate a Malmquist index it translates into specific measures of TFP change and its 
components. Its main shortcoming lies in its deterministic nature, as discussed above.
SF provides instead a general picture of the characteristics of a sector, with the possibility 
of measuring elasticities and other production characteristics. It is better at giving a 
general, statistically more reliable description of the technology and the general direction 
of changes over time. However, depending on the model estimated, it can be less good at 
separating the TFP components.
As a consequence, the use of both techniques would strengthen the analysis of a sector, as 
they reinforce each other through their comparison and the emphasis on different aspects.
Coming to the specific models estimated in Chapters 4 and 5 a few differences have to be 
stressed, which are the reason why, apart from what said above about their opposite 
strengths and focus, a direct comparison in terms for example of ranking of units is not 
appropriate. These differences can be summarised as follows (the reasons have been 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5):
1) The unit of measurement of output is different: 5 output vectors are used in DEA, 2 
indexes are used in SF.
2) DEA imposed constant returns to scale, whereas SF revealed increasing returns to 
scale.
3) The number of cross sectional units was reduced from 53 to 52 for SF.
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This makes it inappropriate to make a one-to-one comparison. It is more meaningful to 
see what general story the two analyses tell, if the results are similar and if not why this is 
the case and if there is any room for reconciliation.
First of all, both techniques point towards a general improvement of productivity over 
time, and towards a change in the technology of production. Hospitals appear to have 
changed the way in which they provide their services, with a possible excess of capital 
and other staff and a reduced use of beds.
SF shows that this change is not only significant, but is associated to a change in the kind 
of services provided, with a marked switch to the treatment of patients on a day-basis. 
This change appears to be associated to the change in status. The structural break in SF is 
1994, when the first trust wave takes place, and the result is confirmed by the DEA - 
Malmquist results: inputs inefficiencies start changing then, and this translates into the 
oscillatory pattern of adjustment between technical efficiency and technological change 
observed more in detail in Chapter 4. If the change in status brought with it a change in 
what hospitals produce and how they produce it, however the very fact of being a trust 
does not appear to be synonymous of higher efficiency. Both chapters concluded for the 
non relevance of being a trust to explain efficiency scores.
The main difference between the results lies in the quantification of the productivity 
improvement and in its attribution to either technological progress or technical efficiency.
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\DEA calculates an improvement in TFP of 3% overall, which is attributed to shifts of the 
frontier, whereas technical efficiency seems to worsen by a -0.3% a year, so -1.5% 
overall (using the year by year results for ease of comparison with SF). SF instead 
concludes for an improvement in technical efficiency over time of a +0.8% a year when 
allowing for the change in technology, and for very pronounced shifts of the frontier.
There are two main reasons for this difference.
First of all, output has been measured in different ways. If Malmquist indexes are 
calculated again using the two output vectors of SF the change in efficiency is now a 
+0.4% a year2. Furthermore, SF showed the existence of increasing returns to scale 
whereas DEA assumed constant returns to scale; as seen in Chapter 3 this can lead to an 
overestimation of the inefficiency of units. The risk that inefficiency might have been 
overestimated by DEA is even greater if the deterministic nature of the approach leads to 
an overestimation of the efficient frontier.
So, if on the one hand the improvement could be a consequence of the output unit of 
measurement used in SF (unnecessarily complicated for DEA which allows for multiple 
outputs) on the other hand the negative change could be a consequence of the 
deterministic nature of this approach. A straightforward conclusion in this respect is 
therefore not possible, except in the sense that if technical efficiency has changed over 
time, this change has not been very pronounced.
2 These results are not included in the thesis as this last analysis was done only to confirm the 
interpretation.
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As regards the measurement of technological progress, the model specification of 
Chapter 5 does make it rather unsuitable to the aim. The model points to the existence of 
a time effect, and the fact that this turns out to be a change in the slope parameters casts a 
lot of doubts on the effect captured by the intercept dummies.
Furthermore, Chapter 5 estimated a distance function, with the outputs ratio among the 
regressors. This is interesting because it allowed to reveal and measure the substitution 
effect between the two main categories of output, but limits the possibility of correctly 
measuring the shifts of the frontier over time. Only the rate of increase in y2  could be 
calculated, besides by a regression that has a decreasing ratio ydyj  on the RHS.
Given this limitation of the SF model, the DEA and Malmquist index results are better 
suited to draw conclusions about the shifts of the frontier.
Putting all the above together, it finally seems appropriate to conclude in this way.
The productivity of hospitals has improved over time in terms of shifts of the efficient 
frontier and possibly, though much more moderately, in terms of distance from it. No 
direct link could however be proved to exist between the status of trust and a higher 
efficiency, as was expected instead by the reform. Another direct effect is instead proved, 
which is the change in what hospitals produce and how they produce it. More people are 
treated on a day-basis, capital levels increase, the number of beds is reduced and a shift 
towards less costly staff probably takes place.
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What answer can be given to the two questions posed at the beginning of the thesis is 
therefore discussed in the next section.
6.2 Conclusions of the thesis.
This thesis performed an analysis of the effects of the 1989 NHS reform of hospital 
services. Without privatising them, this reform introduced competition by creating 
separate figures of purchasers and providers which would operate on the “internal 
market” on the basis of contractual relationships. The idea behind the reform was that 
competition would have improved the efficiency of the provision, leading to reduced 
waste of resources, higher quality levels and more choice to the patients. No real 
guidance was given by the law about the kind of contracts to use, but the general aim was 
to move towards forms of prospective payment based on the average cost of the 
treatments.
The theory of contracts analysed in Chapter 2 showed that defining an “optimal” contract 
for hospital services, if at all possible, is at the very least extremely difficult. Various 
models have been developed by the literature, and one was developed in Section 2.3 to 
deal in particular with the issue of waiting time. Beyond the specific differences among 
these models, one thing that seems common to most of them is the recognition not only 
of the complexity of the issue, but also of the potential drawbacks of prospective payment 
systems. Apart from the informational requirements, the problems in the identification 
and measurement of output and the potentially significant transaction costs, the literature
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showed that this kind of contracts give incentives to cost minimisation, and therefore 
technical efficiency, but can lead to sub-optimal decisions especially (but not exclusively) 
with respect to quality.
The results of the empirical analysis seem not only to confirm such concerns, but to raise 
others. The improvement in technical efficiency is not proved for sure, and in any case is 
not very marked. Moreover, no link is revealed between trust status and efficiency.
The main improvement in productivity over time seems to be given by the shifts of the 
frontier itself, i.e. by technological change. This change in technology is shown to be not 
only a change in the way hospitals provide their services, but also in the kind of services 
they provide.
This, in our opinion, could be a reason of concern.
A trend is revealed in which patients are treated more and more on a day basis. This 
could be the result of technological progress, i.e. the investment in specialised equipment 
and staff, but in that case the elasticity of the input would not be negative and/or its 
“waste” recorded by DEA would not increase. Such results suggest that a lot of the 
increase in capital levels could be due to investments related to the new contracting 
issues. This is confirmed also by the changes in the measured waste and the elasticity of 
the “other staff’ variable. In such a scenario, the reduction in the length of stay and the 
treatment of patients on a day basis could actually imply a reduction in the quality level
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of the service provided. As already stressed, no direct measure of quality was available 
for this thesis, but the concern is not ill founded and the conclusion supported by others’ 
results (Maniadakis et al., 1999).
The new financial concerns therefore seem to have led hospitals on the one hand to divert 
resources towards the new contracting activity, and on the other hand to reduce the 
amount and possibly the quality of the resources devoted to treatment: by using less 
qualified staff, and by reducing the length of treatment. This therefore puts the measured 
increase in productivity in a different light.
There are obviously limitations to the present work, which open the way to future 
research. As seen in Chapter 2, some of the assumptions of the theoretical model could be 
relaxed in order to make the framework more complex and realistic. Empirically, it 
would be interesting to identify and use some measure of quality. Furthermore, the 
availability of data covering the period before the introduction of the reform would be 
particularly interesting: this would in fact allow to make more precise and direct 
comparisons in the trends of productivity and efficiency change, giving more sound 
grounds to the above conclusions.
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